Portland State University

PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

1-1-1983

The health policy gap: income, health insurance and
source of care effects on utilization of and access to
dental, physician and hospital services by Oregon
households
Constance Hall Fitzgerald
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Fitzgerald, Constance Hall, "The health policy gap: income, health insurance and source of care effects on
utilization of and access to dental, physician and hospital services by Oregon households" (1983).
Dissertations and Theses. Paper 830.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.830

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations
and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

THE HEALTH POLICY GAP:
INCOME, HEALTH INSURANCE AND SOURCE OF
CARE EFFECTS ON UTILIZATION OF AND ACCESS TO
DENTAL, PHYSICIAN AND HOSPITAL SERVICES
BY OREGON HOUSEHOLDS

by

CONSTANCE HALL FITZGERALD

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
URBAN ST1JDIES

Portland State University
~1983 Constance Hall Fitzgerald

TO THE OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH:
The members of the Committee approve the dissertation

Dr Grant Farr

Dr Donald Freeborn

Dr Arthur Emlen

APPROVED:

Dr

of Urban Affairs

Dr Stanley E Rauch, Dean, Graduate Studies and Research

AN ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION OF Constance Hall Fitzgerald for the
Doctor of Philosophy in Urban Studies presented on November 2, 1982.
Title:

The Health Policy Gap:

Income, Health Insurance, and Source

of Care Effects on Utilization of and Access to Dental,
Physician, and Hospital Services by Oregon Households.
APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE DISSERTATION COMMITTEE:

Dr Grant Farr

Dr ~ald Freebor~

Dr Arthur Emlen

This study explores the effects of income, insurance, and source
of medical care on access to and utilization of health services.

Pro-

files of dental, physician, and hospital services use are developed for
more than 3,500 Oregonians.

Low income, lack of health insurance,

and/or an inappropriate source of medical care are hypothesized to be
barriers to access and utilization.

Households which face one or more

of these barriers are identified as falling into a "Health Policy Gap."
The data for this study were drawn from a 1978 random telephone
survey of 1249 Oregon households.

The survey was commissioned by the

State Health Planning and Development Agency in conjunction with the

2

Northwest Oregon Health Systems Agency, the Western Oregon Health
Systems Agency, and the Eastern Oregon Health Systems Agency.

The

questionnaire was developed by the Oregon State University Research
Center.

Information was collected on use of health services, insurance

coverage, income, household structure, health needs, health behaviors,
and health satisfaction.
A behavioral model of health services utilization was constructed,
dividing the independent variables according to their relative mutability or amenity to policy intervention.

Income, insurance, and source

of care were selected as policy variables, while other variables less
under policymakers' control were labelled household characteristics.
The latter were assumed to reflect a household's propensity to consume
services.

They included household structure, health need, residential

mobility, and health behaviors.

Dependent variables included measures

of dental and physician visits, use of the telephone for physician advice, preventive exams, and hospitalization during the past year.
Multiple techniques of analysis were employed.

Cross-tabular pro-

cedures were applied to investigate the interrelationship of income,
insurance, and source of care.

Multiple linear regression and partial

correlation methods were used to select as control variables household
characteristics highly correlated to each measure of health services use.
Analysis of variance and multiple classification analysis were used to
develop profiles of health services use.

These last techniques allowed

an examination of the relationship of each policy variable and health
measure while applying increasing levels of statistical control.

The

initial bivariate relationship was studied in isolation; it was then

3

studied while controlling for the other policy variables, and finally
while controlling for both the other policy variables as well as
selected household characteristic variables.
Findings support the hypotheses.

Income is found to be related

to insurance coverage, and insurance coverage to source of medical care,
although income is not found to be directly related to source of care.
Low income, lack of insurance, and an inappropriate source of medical
care depress use across almost all services.

However, their relative

barrier effects differ by the measure of service examined.

After con-

trolling for the effects of household structure, health need, residential
mobility, and health behaviors, the greatest disparity in use of dental
services remains due to income, in physician services to insurance and
income, and in hospital services to insurance.
Clear implications arise for policymakers, whether in the public
or private sectors.

The low income, the uninsured, and those with an

inappropriate source of care face real barriers to access.

Since the

relative magnitude of these barrier effects vary by the health measure
examined, neither income, insurance, nor health system delivery strategies can be assumed to evenly enhance use patterns.

Their effects must

be separately estimated for differing measures of health services.
Furthermore, the relationship between these policy variables needs
detailed study before large-scale policy interventions are undertaken.
Understanding the complexity of these findings for different measures
of health services as well as the interrelationship of income, health
insurance, and source of care is crucial in designing and implementing
more effective and equitable health policies in the future.
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CHAPTER I
THE HEALTH POLICY GAP:
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE:

AN OVERVIEW

A RIGHT OR A PRIVILEGE?

A privilege is a right which is granted as a special
favor. Privileges are inherently private matters. A right
is a privilege which has been extended to all people, and the
preservation and protection of that right becomes a public
matter • • • • If we, as a people, declare that access to
health care is a right, then private medicine becomes a
public matter and the right of access must be protected just
as is our right to a basic education or freedom of speech.
We have not yet made access to needed m~dical care a right in
this country. Not in law, and not in practice. We have said
it, and declared it, and even tried to promise it, but until
we make it a legally enforceable right • • • it will remain,
in practice, a privilege. l
In this country, there is a growing consensus that all Americans
have a right to at least a minimum level of health care. 2
conse~'~ence

This is a

of several developments within the past two decades which

include the public's increased expectations of modern medicine's
miracles, their demand for relief from the spiraling costs of health
care, and the widespread view that government is responsible for
ensuring health care to the needy.3

Opinion polls demonstrate the

pervasiveness of this belief; they show that the majority of Americans
accept the concept of national health insurance and insist on the
federal government's accepting primary responsibility for ending
poverty.

Paradoxically, these sentiments coexist with the convictions

that any able-bodied person who wants to can provide for himself and

2

that Americans should rely more heavily on individual initiative and
less on gover~~ent programs. 4 Ambivalence, in terms of individual
versus collective responsibilities towards the needy, is an underlying
theme in the American value system.
within the context of a diffuse success ideology, the adult
population discriminates among welfare state policies. If the
beneficiaries seem to work for it (earnings-based pensions,
prepaid medical insurance) it is good, and big majorities of the
respondents in national cross section samples generally support an
actual or proposed program. If the benefit is unearned or
perceived as unearned (AFDC, unemployment compensation), it is bad
and majorities typically reject the program. 5
HISTORICAL TRENDS:

GROWTH OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INSURANCE

Expansion of Private Health Insurance
Two trends have influenced Americans' access to

hee:~.

\ :are:

expansion of private insurance and the advent of public :
certain groups of the low income and elderly.

the

nce for

The former, 1n

particular, has played a major role in changing the American
household's use of health services.

Since the 1940's, health insurance

coverage is estimated to have expanded by nearly six times -- from 15%
to 88%.6

Employer-provided health insurance programs provide

mainstream access to health care for the majority of Americans.
Accompanying the growth in private insurance coverage is the
establishment of public insurance programs designed to protect the
disadvantaged.

3

Public Health Insurance Programs
The advent of Medicaid and Medicare in the 1960's has reduced
existing financial barriers to the 49 million poor and elderly
estimated eligible for coverage under these programs. 7

Eligible

households are generally either those headed by poor females with
dependent children, those including persons 65 years of age or older,
or those containing disabled persons.

Entrance of the millions of

publicly insured to the health marketplace has contributed to the
escalating costs and rising levels of demand for health services. 8
Unfortunately, the growth of private insurance and the start of public
insurance programs may well only worsen existing barriers to access for
households which are unable to obtain private coverage and ineligible
for Medicaid and Medicare.
Present patterns of public insurance eligibility are best
understood by considering the history of social welfare program growth
in the United States.

Increasingly, government has intervened to

provide food, shelter, and medical care to the needy through
disbursement of cash and also through in-kind social programs (e.g.,
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Social Security, Foodstamps,
Medicare, and Medicaid).

These programs indicate society's commitment

to provide a social safety net to protect its members against the
unpredictability and devastation of such catastrophes as death,
disability, and divorce.

However, society encourages its members to

attempt to be self-sufficient before seeking aid; therefore, a system
of health care has evolved in which the majority of households are

4

assured access to health care by employer-provided insurance.

Those

needy eligible for public insurance are enabled access through Medicare
or Medicaid, and the remaining needy get by as best they can.
Two facts are important in understanding why public insurance
programs protect some types of needy households while purposely
excluding others.

These are the categorical eligibility requirements

of the early social welfare programs to which Medicare and Medicaid
eligibility are linked.

The incremental and unrestrained growth of

these social programs over time has culminated in today's fragmented
and exlusionary system of public health insurance.
Incremental Growth.

In December of 1974, the Subcommittee on

Fiscal policy of the Joint Economic Committee made the following
assessment:
The current cr~s~s in social
mushrooming growth of an array
inaugurated at different times
means of different strategies.
have created a system built on

welfare policy is due to the
of programs that were
to meet specific problems by
A series of piecemeal efforts
conflicting principles. 9

The first of these programs was the Social Security Act of 1935.

It

began a movement away from a laissez-faire philosophy and towards what
has been termed the welfare state.

Social Security depended on the

theory of social insurance to protect workers and their familites
against the financial ravages of retirement, disability, and death.
The program was originally based on the principle of assigning benefits
according to the amount the worker had earned.

Almost immediately this

principle was compromised by the concept of need-equity, which adjusted
the worker's earnings-based benefit level by the number of dependents.

5

Certain other groups judged unable to support themselves (e.g., the
blind, the disabled, and the children of disabled or deceased workers),
were later included. lO

Today's Social Security program illustrates

, the historical ambivalence of society towards benefit level adequacy
versus work incentives, as well as the conflict between equal help for
equal need versus differential rewards for past work and saving. ll
Cate90rical Eligibility.

Aid to Families with Dependent Children

(AFDC) was the first,purely need-based social welfare program.
provided a model for other categorical programs.

It

Generally speaking,

only women with young children qualified for benefits.

Eligibility was

affected by race, family structure, and judgments by program staff of
applicants' morality.

Not until 1948, for example, did Black

households appear on the welfare rolls in any number, whatever their
family structure or financial need. 12

unmarried mothers, or those

with nonmarital relationships, and male-headed households were often
summarily excluded.

Even today, only one half of the states offer

benefits to male-headed families, regardless of financial need. 13
The exclusion of households who do not fit narrow categories of
eligibility for Social Security and AFDC has been carried over to
Medicare and Medicaid requirements.

The original programs excluded

some of the needy so as to enhance work effort for noneligible
households, cut program costs, and enhance the political viability of
the programs involved.

14

Medicaid was intended to serve those

households eligible for AFDC, while Medicare focused on individuals
eligible for Social Security.

6

The Health policy Gap.

The unhappy result of fragmented social

welfare program growth and exclusionary eligibility requirements for
such programs is that a sizeable number of financially needy American
households are now left in a health policy gap.

Households headed by a

working adult, by two parents, or by those barely above the official
poverty line are penalized for their efforts to be self-sufficient, to
provide a stable family structure, and to avoid stigmatizing social
programs such as ~'lelfare, 15

Twelve percent of all Americans, or

twenty-four million people, are estimated to be without health
.

16.

1nsurance.

.

In Oregon, th1s 12% represents approx1mately 250,000

l
people of all ages. ?

The history of social welfare program growth

has helped create this Health Policy Gap, and the pressures of New
Federalism and the economic recession have widened it.
THE PRESENT:

NEW FEDERALISM, RECESSION, AND LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY

New Federalism
President Reagan's inaugural speech clearly articulates the
concept of New Federalism:
It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the
Federal establishment and to demand recognition of the
distinction between the powers granted to the federal
government and those reserved to the states or people. All
of us need to be reminded that the Federal government did not
create the states; the states created the Federal
government. 18
A national economic recession and the Administration's emphasis on a
balanced federal budget, in conjunction with New Federalism, means that
at least the immediate future holds little promise for increased

7
spending on health care for the needy.

The explosive growth of social

programs in the past two decades and the concurrent inadequate
utilization and cost controls on Medicaid and Medicare programs have
led to disenchantment with the goals of social opportunity and
increased equity.

As a result, the trend of policymaking has recently

shifted in the direction of fiscal conservatism and an "If-I-can-makeit,-you-can-make-it" attitude towards the poor.

Cost containment has

become the potent rallying cry used by conservative forces in Congress
to fight social welfare spending.
Block Grants.

President Reagan stated in 1981 that block grants

consolidation would be used to cut subsidies to regional and local
government as a means of reducing wasteful administrative overhead and
to give state and local government more autonomy.l9

A key objective

of the block grant proposals was to lessen federal involvement in and
control over program design and delivery.

This, it was reasoned, would

give state and local governments more flexibility, authority, and
responsibility within broad federal guidelines. 20

As signed by the

President, the Act combines over twenty health care programs into seven
block grants with an overall twenty-five percent reduction in
funding. 21
Funding Cuts.

Administration officials contended that some of the

losses in funding to the states would be offset by administrative
savings due to decreased federal red tape.

Table I compares the

Administration's original two block grant proposals with those
eventually adopted by the Congress.
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Attempts to cut existing levels of funding for Medicare and Medicaid
have alarmed many congressmen.

Proposed administration cuts brought

this response, for example, from Oregon Representative, Ron Wyden:
Flying in the face or reason, the Administration has
proposed slashing some $2.2 billion from Medicaid and some
$2.5 billion from Medicare in 1983 • • • the Administration
has once again ignored the prescription for long-term
recovery, preferring the meat-axe approach that will only
shift the burden of health care onto the shoulders of senior
citizens, the needy and health care providers.
The Medicare system is • • • in the red because the federal
government has perpetuated a perverse reimbursement system
that actually rewards waste and inefficiency • • • • We hand
health care providers a blank check to fill in after the care
is provided, rather than negotiating reasonable health care
packages in advance. 23
In 1982, almost $325 million was slashed from reimburserrlents to
hospitals for Medicare and Medicaid patients, reducing payments to only
85% of the cost of medical care given the poor and elderly under these
programs.

24

Such losses are shifted, at least in part, to the costs

of privately insured patients and to those households without insurance
coverage.

Because the primary responsibility for serving the health

care needs of the poor has historically been left to state and local
governments, the effects of block grants and reduced funding have put
these policymakers into a moral and economic quandry.
State and Local Impacts
State Funding.

Under the rubric of new federalism and consumer

sovereignty, the importance of social services has been de-emphasized
by the federal government; absolute decreases in resource transfers
have accompanied the de-emphasis.

In Oregon, these reductions in the

10
availability of federal monies have occurred as revenue sources have
become outstripped by an upswing in demand for services and surging
health care costs.

These factors in combination significantly decrease

state and local governments' ability to meet even existing levels of
need.
During the 1981 Oregon Legislative Session, the Department of
Human Resources attempted to address federal funding reductions for
social service programs in the amount of $118.7 million dollars. 25
(A preliminary estimate of Oregon's 1982 block grant authorization is
found in Table II).

The state's initial strategy was to attempt to

replace reduced federal monies with General State Funds.

Even as

replaced by general funds health, block monies for primary health care,
alcohol/drugs and mental health, preventive health, and child health
were diminished by approximately 25%.

Absolute decreases in revenue

transfers for health care by the federal government have drastically
lessened existing health care access for Oregon's needy.
Local Responsibility.

Inflationary forces may now be the

strongest the health care system has faced since the early 1930's.26
The danger exists that with the growth of a medically indigent
population, the current system will eventually collapse.

Don

Schictman, Director of the State Medicaid program, states:
The questions now being raised ·:ire not simply what level of
care the poor can expect, or who should shoulder the costs of
providing it. The question is, how do we keep the health
care system from collapsing. 27
State and local governments are restricted in their ability to cover
federal revenue shortfalls by a combination of constitutional
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TABLE II
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF OREGON'S BLOCK GRANT ALLOCATION
FFY 1982 AT THE AUTHORIZATION LEVEL 28

Estimated Allocations Under

Blocks

Oregon's Share
of Current
Programs

Current
Programs
IT.J 1981

Block
Grant
FFY 1982

Chanqes

%

1.

Social Services

1.162

33.186m

27.736m

-16.4

2.

AID & Mental Health

0.905

5.775m

4.444m

-23.0

3.

Energy

1.245

22.123m

23.346m

+ 2.7

4.

Primary Health Care

1.670

5.428m

5.052m *

- 6.9

5.

Community Services

0.846

3.182m

2.999m

- 5.8

6.

Preventive Health

1.045

1.359m

.993m

-26.9

7.

Maternal & Child Health

1.185

5.049m

3.758m

-25.6

76.702m

68.326m

-10.9

* States cannot administer the Primary Health Care program during FFY
the figure shown is the FFY 1983 authorization level.

1982;
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limitations on raising the property tax, practical enforcement
restraints on the income tax, and constituent unwillingness to impose a
regressive sales tax.

These revenue inelasticities are exacerbated by

increased rates of unemployment, failures of businesses, and escalating
costs of health care.

The results are that many Oregon households now

face even greater financial barriers to obtaining necesary health care
than they faced in the recent past.
Locally, Multnomah County's problems illustrate the situation of
local government in meeting the responsibility of health care for the
medically indigent.

Currently, this demand seems insurmountable.

With

a 6% annual increase cap on property taxes, the County's main revenue
source, it is virtually impossible for revenues to keep pace with
current rates of inflation and increased demand.
(9.8% in

~ugust

Unemployment rates

of 1982) are some of the highest since such records

have been collected.
to local government.
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Reductions in federal funding are passed on
Local government, unable to meet these costs,

ultimately places the burden on the shoulders of providers with
negative implications for the disadvantaged's access to health care.
Provider Cost Shifts.

In recent years, hospital write-offs for

charity, bad debts, and inadequate reimbursement by Medicaid and
have be en growlng
"
"
Me d lcare
stea dOl
1 y. 30

"
Nort hwest area h
ospltals
have

seen losses rise from 6.1% in 1974 to 16% in 1981. 31

In 1981, losses

from these factors totalled $94 million, a $19 million increase over
previous years.

The Northwest Oregon Council of Hospitals estimates

that cost shifts (efforts by providers to pass along such costs to
private patients) have added $150-$170 per day to the bill of

13
.
1
·
d patlents.
.
32
prlvate
y-lnsure

The elderly, the poor, and the unemployed tend to be concentrated
in urban areas, and therefore inner city hospitals bear the brunt of
such losses; suburban hospitals remain relatively unaffected.
Hospitals' alternatives are to shift additional costs to private
patients, cut personnel, institute prepayment practices, eliminate high
cost, technologically intensive programs (e.g. neonatal care), and
eventually turn those who cannot pay away from their doors.

33

In

many areas of the United states, the urban-poor/suburban-rich dichotomy
has already created two hospital systems. 34
The plight of Emanuel Hospital illustrates the seriousness of the
crisis.

An inner-city hospital attempting to meet the needs of its

area's poor and elderly, Emanuel is hard hit.

Cost shifts per day are

over $226, increasing the bill for one day of hospitalization to $587
dollars.

With 62% of its patient population insured by Medicaid and

Medicare, this hospital is currently forced to shift almost 22% of its
revenues or $14 million dollars annually.

By January 1981, Emanuel's

losses on care given the poor were $9.7 million dollars.

Hospital

administrators implemented the following strategies to cOI}nter
anticipated fiscal year deficits:

laying off 158 employees, cancelling

the building program, forbidding elective surgery without prepayment,
and seriously considering the elimination of several programs.

Rising

unemployment had already caused the number of patients obtaining
elective surgery to drop almost 40% from the same period the year
before, as households lost employer-provided health insurance and
suffered reductions in the ability to pay for care out-of-pocket. 35
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Implications for the future of health services delivery are
ominous.

The question raised by administrators of hospitals such as

Emanuel is, "At what point can these costs no longer by shifted onto
the private sector?"36

Blue Cross and OPS Blue Shield, the state's

two largest insurance carriers (now in the process of consolidation),
pay the bulk of these cost shifts to private patients.

Blue Cross of

Oregon lost $4.9 million in 1981 and has subsequently announced rate
increases of 20-50%.

A spokesperson states that Blue Cross is pricing

itself out of the market.

This observation seems borne out as

employers seek lower-cost employee benefit packages; and the
unemployed, unable to self-insure, join the swelling ranks of other
households in the health policy gap.
In summary, need in the American system of social welfare, is not
now and never has been the sale determinant of eligibility for
assistance.

Access to health care is ensured for those with

employer-provided private insurance coverage, assured for those needy
who are eligible for Medicaid or Medicare, and ignored for those needy
who are not eligible for public insurance.

This historical background

provides a perspective from which to examine access and equity issues
in health care for Oregon households in the Health policy Gap.
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CHAPTER II
J. MODEL FOR HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a behavioral model of
health services utilization.

For policymakers, the potential of a

behavioral model lies in its delineation of causal patterns and the
subsequent increased understanding and prediction of patterns of human
behavior.

Empirical testing of such a model allows inferences to be

drawn from the data which may ultimately lead to increased control over
the occurrence of natural events.
larg6~

No model, however, exists outside a

and more complex system of synergistic cause and effect, a

system composed of decisionmakers frequently at crosspurposes about
values, goals, and the means to those goals.
Models attempting to explain the relationship between various
correlates and utilization of health services can be placed in one of
three general categories, depending upon where the locus of
responsibility for utilization is put:

on the individual, on system

factors, or on the joint interaction of the individual and system
factors. l
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Individual Characteristics Models
The perspective which emphasizes the importance of the
individual's characteristics on use of health services is typified by
the Health Belief Model. 2

This model assumes a sequential behavioral

decision process wherein the individual perceives, evaluates, and
responds to symptoms.

Threats of illness are weighed against the

benefits of obtaining treatment in order to make decisions about use of
services.

Given an individual's particular set of symptoms and

social-structural characteristics, four key elements affect the
decision to act:
1)

health motivations which represent differences in concern
for health matters;

2)

the threat posed by the symptoms, including physical harm
and possible interference with daily functioning;

3)

benefits, efficacy, or value of actions to reduce the
threat; and

4)

costs of or barriers to the action. 3
In related work, stoeckle, Zola, and Davidson (1963) conclude that

a patient's decision to seek medical care in response to symptoms
depends on the objective clinical disorder, the patient's perceptions,
knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes about the symptoms; attitudes and
expectations of the phYSician and medical system; definitions of health
and sickness;-dnd the point at which medical care becomes necessary.4
A global model of medical services utilization is proposed by
Suchman (1965).

He suggests that the degree of social group

organization and the medical orientation of an individual are directly
related to differences in patterns of medical services use. 5

He
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describes social group organization as varying from parochial to
cosmopolitan, while he sees medical orientation as depending on the
individual's cognitive knowledge about disease, affective skepticism
about medical care, and behavioral dependency during illness. 6
Suchman links parochial social group organization and nonscientific
medical care orientation, concluding that both are major causes of
,
,
1nappropr1ate
ut1'1"1zat10n. 7

the influence of

~he

Kosa and Robertson (1969) also emphasize

individual's family, friends, and other lay

advisors in the analysis of and response to illness symptoms.

Their

model includes cultural, situational, and interactional patterns. 8
Fabrega (1973) uses a sequential model to outline behavioral
process stages associated with illness.

This model assumes that

symptoms are interpreted through the person's individual taxonomy and
that the person is rational and prefers an illness-free condition. 9
Decisionmaking behavioral stages include illness recognition,
assessment of the costs and benefits of treatment, selection of
treatment, and the recycling of information for the next episode of
illness behavior. 10
Structural/Ecological Models
A second category of models places the locus of decisionmaking and
responsibility for utilization primarily on structural factors--the
necological and functional relationships between economic or community
resources and the recipients of services. nIl

Access, or the

individual's ability to obtain health services when and where needed,
is often an implicit or explicit concern.

These models emphasize the

21

demand-inducing or demand-suppressing effects of structural variables
on health services use.

12

The structural/ecological approach

stresses, among others, the following factors:
•

methods of financing (insurance coverage, prepayment,
deductibles, co-insurance, fee-for-service, etc.),

•

geographic variables (distance and availability), and

•

organizational resources (facilities and range, quality,
scope, and coordination of services).13

Methods of financing are the major thrust of models
demand theory in health services utilization.

emphasizi~g

The effects of insurance

types, elasticities of demand, and national health insurance on use of

~ervices are common emphases of these models. 14 Other research
examines the effects of public insurance on access to health services
for the poor. IS
Other structural/ecological research examines geographic factors
and organizational resources as influences on health services use. 16
Source of medical care (outpatient or emergency room treatment versus
services of a private physician) has been found to vary by social
class.

Geographical distance and services availability are also

related to patterns of utilization.
Holistic, or Joint Interaction Models
The third category of behavior models assumes utilization to be a
joint function of factors both internal and external to the
individual. 17

This holistic approach is typified by Andersen's

(1968) model of health services utilization and Andersen and Newman's
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(1973) framewor.k for viewing health services utilization. lS

This

type of model incorporates the following concepts:
•

an economic emphasis upon the family as the unit of
analysis~

factors~

•

separation of economic and social

•

analysis of separate types of health

•

inclusions of perceptions of health and

•

specification of causal paths leading to health service
use. 19

services~
illness~

and

This model posits that a family's use of health services depends on its
predisposition to use them, its ability to secure them, and its need
for them (see Figure 1).
PREDISPOSING ---..;:>~ ENABLING ----~--..:;>:;. NEED -----...,;>~ USE

Family Composition

Family Resources

Illness

Social Structure

Community Resources

Response

Health Beliefs
Figure 1. A behavioral model of families' use of health
services. 20
Andersen finds that predisposing and enabling components are more
useful in explaining the utilization of discretionary services (such as
dental), while the need component figures largest for nondiscretionary
uses (for example, hospital and physician services) .21
The behavioral model of health services utilization focuses on the
interplay of factors--both external and internal--which affect
families' use of health services.

The model is placed within a larger

context by Andersen and Newman's framework for viewing health services
utilization (see Figure 2.)
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SOCIETAL DETERMINANTS

.oE(~-------->~

Technology
Norms

HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM

Resources
Organization
INDIVIDUAL DETERMINANTS
(Behavioral Model)
Predisposing
Enabling
Illness Level

~

HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION
Type
Purpose
Unit of Analysis
Figure 2.

A framework for viewing health services utilization. 22

This framework postulates reciprocal causal links between societal
determinants, the health services system and individual determinants,
i.e., each affects, and in turn is affected by, the others.

Societal

determinants are subdivided in the model into technology and norms.
Norms are reflected, not only through legislation, but also through
society's converging beliefs and opinions, as, for example, the
emerging belief that all Americans have a right to health care. The
health services system is perceived as being divided into resources
(including the volume and distribution of labor and capital) and
organization, which involves both access (system entry) and structure
(system characteristics which determine what happens to the patient
following entry).23
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THE POOR:

A SPECIAL CASE OF HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION

Andersen's (1969) and Andersen and Newman's (1973) research work
together constitute a systems model of health services utilization.
Ecological, organizational, and individual factors are integrated
within the model.

Some factors are relatively constant and

unchangeable from a policy perspective, while others are more policy
mutable and therefore more likely to be under the control of
policymakers.

For the disadvantaged, variables emerge as important

determinants of access which are of little import for other types of
households.

For example, Davis and Reynolds (1975) develop a model of

utilization for the publicly insured that includes not only patient
characteristics, but also physician preferences for certain kinds of
patients, and features of public insurance programs which vary by
state.
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Seeking an explanation for the lower use of health services by the
poor, Dutton

(197~)

looks at the

i~pact

of financial coverage, the

culture of poverty, and systems barriers to health services use. 25
Each of these explanations has been presented as a reason why the poor
use fewer health services than do others.

Noting disputes over the

relative importance of financial versus health system barriers,
Lefcowitz (1973) notes, "Whichever side of the argument is taken, two
'facts' are accepted as true:

1) poverty leads to less medical care;

and 2) poverty results in diminished health."26
The Culture of Poverty Explanation
Perhaps the most insidious in its implications for

policyma~ing

is

25

Lewis' (1966) theory of the culture of poverty.

Lewis suggests that

poverty is an intergenerational phenomenon, handed down as a collection
of adaptive and reactive responses by the poor to their social and
economic situations.

Socioeconomic characteristics of the individual

are seen as causing inappropriate use of health services, which in turn
leads to poor health.

policy implications of the acceptance of this

theory verge on what Ryan (1971) labels as "blaming the victim."27
Zola (1973) places responsibility for inappropriate delays in
obtaining medical care on
• • • a list of faults--the patient has no time, no money
• • • is of lower education, socioeconomic status, or an ethnic
or racial minority. As the researchers might put it, there is
something about these people or in their backgrounds which has
disturbed their rationality, for otherwise they would
"naturally" seek aid. 28
This approach assumes that the individual is irrational and at fault
for not using medical services appropriately.

No consideration is

given to barriers to appropriate use due to environmental factors
outside the individual's control.

Fixed individual characteristics

(religion, ethnicity, race) are lumped together with factors which are
more mutable.

The inference that culture alone accounts for low use of

health services by the poor places the blame directly on those least
able to help themselves.

It may also lead to the erroneous conclusion

that individual characteristics should be the major focus of policy
interventions, while important environmental and structural factors are
perceived as immutable.

Hyman (1970), for example, concludes that by

• • • reducing fatalism and discontent, or establishing lay
referral networks where none yet exist, an increase in
utilization can be effected without dealing directly with the
economic poverty variable which is antecedent to these
variables. 29

26

Financial/Systems Barriers Explanations
Both financial and system barrier explanations place the major
responsibility for inappropriate use of health services of the poor
primarily on the environmental/ecological/structural context within
which this group functions.

The financial barrier explanation posits

that poor people, given financial access, can ultimately "express their
demand in the medical marketplace, and that this demand will then
attract a sufficient supply of health producers."30

Source of care,

distance from a health care facility, and quality of care are perceived
as creating barriers to system use by the poor.

In examining cultural,

financial, and systems access explanations, Dutton (1978) finds that
income-related factors, especially the type of health system used, play
a greater role (at least for discretionary care) than do inadequate
financial coverage and negative attitudes towards health care. 3l
Separately considered, the cultural, financial, and system
barriers explanations are inadequate.

The weakness of each of these

explanations lies in the attempt to ignore the interaction of internal
and external forces on ind5.vidual consumption patterns.
A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION
This study developes a model based on an extensive litelature
review of variables correlated to health services use.

Income, health

insurance coverage, and appropriateness of usual source of medical care
are selected as policy mutable variables.

Their effects on Health

Policy Gap households are examined, both singly and in combination.
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Utilization profiles are compared for dental, physician, and hospital
services.
Variables are classified into three types:

measures of

utilization, household characteristics, and policy variables.

The

relative individual and combined effects of lower income, lack of
health insurance, and an inappropriate source of medical care are
hypothesized to act as barriers to utilization of health services by
Health policy Gap households.
The Model
The model postulates a causal process wherein the effects of
household characteristics (household structure, occupation, residential
mobility, health behaviors, and health need) on use of health services
are mediated by the above-mentioned policy variables.

In an equitable

health care system, the influences of the policy variables on health
service use should be negligible.

Differences proceeding from

household characteristics unrelated to system or structural barrier
effects remain a matter of consumer preference or taste.

Differences

in health services use attributable to system or structural barriers,
however, are determined to be the basis 'for policy interventions (see
Figure 3).
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HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS ~ POLICY VARIABLES

~UTILIZATION

1.

Household Structure

1.

Income

2.

Health Need

2.

Health Insurance Coverage

a.

Dental

3.

Residential Mobility

3.

b.

Physician

4.

Health Behaviors

Appropriateness
of Usual Source
of Medical Care

c.

Hospital

Type:

Figure 3. The causal sequence of household health services
utilization.

Lower Income

---.....,>~

Lack of Health
Insurance

---->~

Inappropriate Source
on Medical Care

Figure 4. Barriers to health service utilization by "Health
policy Gap" households.
Health Services Use
Use of health services is the dependent or outcome variable.
Access to health care is defined as use of health services after
controlling for the effects of differing levels of need for
services. 32

Dental, physician, and hospital services use are

considered separately.

To arrive at an empirical estimate of access,

health need is treated as an independent variable whose effects on the
dependent variable are controlled for, thereby insuring that higher
levels of need associated with low income will not obscure the overall
patterns of use.
Dental, physician, and hospital services are assumed to vary in
terms of the discretionary control afforded the consumer.

The
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household is perceived to retain most control or choice over the use of
dental services, less for physician services, and least for hospital
services, if every other factor remains constant.

The policy variables

combined with household characteristics should have more explanatory
power for those services where the consumer retains the most choice.
This may result from the consumer's perception of some services as less
immediately health- or life-threatening than others (such as dental or
preventive services) and from differences in the degree of provider
control over the extent, duration, and quality of services used (see
Figure 5).
Dental Services

Physician Services

I

I

<

Hospital Services

I

CONSUMER CONTROL

>

PROVIDER CONTROL

Figure 5. Consumer/provider control over utilization by type of
health service. 33
Rates of use for various health services are analyzed both for
individuals and, when appropriate, for households.

Dental services use

is defined as the number of times each household member has seen a
dentist during the preceding twelve months.

Use of physician services

is measured by the number of times such services are reported as being
used, either by in-person visits, telephone calls, or use of preventive
exams (blood pressure, blood sugar, Pap Smear, breast, or prostate).
The Independent Variables
Eight independent variables are chosen for their relevance to
utilization.

They are divided into household characteristics and

30
policy variables.

Household characteristics are hypothesized to

reflect the propensity of the household to need or use services and are
used as control measures.

They include household structure,

residential mobility, health behaviors, and reported health need.
Policy variables, chosen for their relative mutability or amenability
to wide-scale policy intervention, include income, insurance coverage,
and appropriateness of source of medical care.

Low income, lack of

health insurance, and an inappropriate source of medical care are the
hypothesized predicted inhibitors of appropriate health services use.
Household Characteristics
Household Structure.

Household structure includes measures of

members' ages, gender, and household size. 34

This variable is

included to specify stages in the life cycle of households and to
determine associated needs for health care.

Both the very young and

very old, for example, are high users of health services. 35
Household size and use of health services are also related:
increases, average rates of service use tend to level off. 36

as size
Family

size and number of restricted due to illness disability days together
have been found to contribute almost 30% of the total variation in
physician services use. 37
services use.

Gender is also found to influence health

For example, females in the child-bearing years consume

more health services than do males. 38
Health Need.

Measures of health need include reported health

conditions of household members, number of disability days reported in
the past twelve months due to ill health, and the respondent's rating
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of and general satisfaction with the household's health.

Need is the

strongest predictor of differences in families' use of health
services.

Number of disability days is the best predictor of families'

total use of health services. 39
use of services:

This also holds true for individual

the more disability days an individual reports, the

more likely that individual is to seek a physician's services. 40
Residential Mobility.

Residential mobility is measured by the

number of years the household has lived both in the community and in
its current dwelling unit.

Mobility is included as an indicator of

lifestyle, and higher rates of residential mobility are positively
associated with higher rates of social and cultural mobility.

Social

and cultural mobility have been correlated with higher rates of disease
and conditio:ns such as coronary heart disease, complications of
pregnancy and depression. 41
Health B,ehaviors.

Measures of health behavior include the

frequency and quantity of alcohol consumption, quantity of cigarettes
smoked, and amount of regular exercise by at least one household
member.

Generally speaking, health behaviors are those behaviors which

reflect the individual's attitudes towards health maintenance and which
are assumed to affect health.

They may have a negative impact (such as

smoking or excessive alcohol consumption) or a positive impact (such as
regular exercise).42
The policy Variables
This study examines the effects of three possible barriers--low
income, lack of health insurance, and an inappropriate source of
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care--on services use.

Households facing one or more of these barriers

are hypothesized to use fewer health services than households not
facing such barriers.

Exceptions occur as a function of unique

characteristics of the health care system or of the household in
question.

A low income household eligible for public insurance, for

example, may face no financial barrier in obtaining health services.

A

household with certain antihealth care beliefs, sufficient resources,
and/or extremely high levels of health may prefer to handle its health
care expenses on an out-of-pocket basis or to utilize alternative lay
sources of health care.

Household numbers may lack an appropriate

source of care because they have recently moved to a new area, because
they are dissatisfied with known health care sources, or simply because
they do not feel a need for health care.

In general, however, the

factors of low income, lack of insurance, and an inappropriate source
of care, both singly and in combination, are hypothesized to comprise
substantial barriers to the use of health services.
Income.

Four income groups are used for purposes of comparison:

low income (households grossing less than $10,000 in 1977), lower
middle income (households with a gross income in 1977 or $10,000 to
$14,999), upper middle income (households in the $15,000 to $24,999
range for 1977), and high income (households grossing more than $25,000
in 1977).43

The low income are found to experience higher levels of

sickness and mortality than higher income groups.

Findings suggest

that income plays an important role in the severity of health
conditions of the poor and in their lower levels of health services
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use.

Those in the lower classes have historically had lower life

expectancies and higher death rates than other socio-economic
groups.44

Even today, mortality rates for the poor run four times

higher than the national average for persons under twenty-five years of
age.

45

Illness conditions reported by those below the poverty line

are found to be serious more often than those by other segments of the
population. 46

The poor are found to have far higher rates of heart

disease, diabetes, hypertension, arthritis, rheumatism, visual
impairments, liver and stomach problems, and other chronic health
problems (especially long-term activity-restricting problems) .47
Low income persons are initially found to use health services more
frequently than middle income persons (see Figure 6).

However, once

rates of use are adjusted for need for health care, the pattern is
transformed into one in which use of health services rises uniformly
with income: i.e., the low income use least health services, the lower
middle income use more, the upper middle income use even more, and the
high income use most (see Figures 7 and 8).
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Traditionally, lower rates of use for dental services still
persist for the low income (see Figure 9).

Recent data indicate that

low-income persons are only one-third as likely to see a dentist during
a twelve-month period as are those in the highest income group.51
The differences among the percentages of high, medium, and low
income groups seeing a physician in a twelve-month period have
decreased over time (see Figure 10).
·
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Historically, lower income groups have had lower hospital
admission rates than higher income groups.56

However, this

relationship has shown a reversal in the past few decades, largely due
to the growth of health insurance and income transfer programs such as
Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC).57

For the decade

ending in 1973, data describing frequency of hospital use displayed a
bimodal distribution, with both the high and low income groups being
more substantial users than the middle income. 58
Insurance.

Health insurance categories are defined as uninsu!ed

households (in which no member is insured) and insured households (in
which at least one member is covered by health insurance).
Two insurance trends have influenced health service use patterns
for American households:

the expansion of private health insurance and

the advent of public insurance for certain segments of the low income
and the elderly.

The expansion of private health insurance has played

a major role in changing health service utilization patterns of the
American household.

Nationwide, health insurance coverage has expanded

nearly six times, from 15% for hospital and surgical-medical in the
1940's to 88% for all forms of health insurance in 1978. 59
Estimates vary widely regarding the extent of coverage through
private health insurance.

For persons under the age of sixty-five,

estimates range from 78% to 86% in 1976 (151 to 164 million insured
persons).

60

Evidence shows that approximately 32% of Medicaid

eligibles in that year also had private insurance.

Almost 40% of these

were elderly persons who had both private and Medicare coverage. 6l
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The advent of public health insurance (Medicare and Medicaid) in
1965 reduced differences in use of medical services among income
groups.

Public insurance has significantly increased rates of health

services use for the eligible poor compared with those poor either
ineligible for public insurance or unwilling to apply for it (see
Figure 11).

Program data from 1976, however, show that only 40% of

those eligible for Medicaid actually received benefits during the
period of the study.

The participation rate was judged to be even

lower for the medically needy, with only 30% of the 6 million eligibles
using benefits in states offering them. 62
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Levels of health services use have been significantly increased by
public insurance for those households eligible for coverage under
Medicare or Medicaid (see Figure 11).

Those low income households not

insured by either Medicaid or Medicare still lag substantially behind,
particularly for physician services use.

Many of the differences in

use of dental, physician, and hospital services by income groups are
due to the lack of insurance.

As late as 1976, for example, 88% of the

population had medical insurance, while only 18% had dental
insurance. 64

One researcher comments:

• • • dental services are least apt to be covered by existing
financing mechanisms and it is this service for which the
greatest inequities in use by family income • • • continue(s) to
persist. 65
Although dental care is still generally not covered by insurance,
research shows that persons with any type of health insurance are more
likely to see a dentist than those who are uninsured. 66

Third party

coverage notably attenuates income differences and may even reverse the
effects of poverty on use, especially for services use initiated by the
patient. 67
Source of Medical Care
A distinction is made between an appropriate and an inappropriate
source of usual medical care.

The only appropriate source of medical

care is a physician's office.

An inappropriate source of care is

defined as either no reported source of usual care, or use of a
hospital emergency room, hospital outpatient clinic, public health
clinic or company clinic for routine treatment.
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Different patterns of health care access emerge for the poor than
for other income groups. 68

Findings suggest that the lower use rates

found for the poor may be due to inadequacies in the health system they
use.

69

The system that serves the poor is characterized by uneven

quality and a lack of coordination of services, in conjunction with an
imperfect integration of the entire care system. 70
Patterns of health care use by the poor differ from the norm in
terms of types of facilities and services, as well as in the stability
of the patient-provider relationship.7l

Low income households are

more likely to either lack an appropriate provider of care or to report
an inappropriate source of care.

72

The poor are found to be twice as

likely as the general population to go to a hospital clinic or an
emergency room, and 14% of the low income report no regular source of
medical care. 73

Davis and Reynolds (1975) find that even the insured

poor do not obtain care in the same type of setting, from the same kind
of physicians, and with the same ease and convenience as do higher
income persons, although they are more likely than the uninsured poor
to procure medical care, especially hospitalization. 74
Hypotheses
The hypotheses are:
•

Lower income is related to lack of health insurance, which, in
turn, is related to an inappropriate source of usual medical
care.

•

Income explains more variation in the utilization of health
services than either health insurance coverage or
appropriateness of usual source of medical care do.
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•

Income, insurance coverage, and appropriateness of usual
source of medical care account for the variation in
services utilization: greater for dental, less for
physician and least for hospital.

•

Households with low incomes are less apt to utilize health
services than are households with high incomes.

•

Households lacking health insurance are less apt to
utilize health services than are households with health
insurance.

•

Households without an appropriate source of usual medical
care are less apt to utilize health services than are
households with an appropriate source of usual medical
care.

The Sample
The data source for the study is a 1978 telephone survey of 1249
Oregon households comprised of 3521 individuals.

The survey instrument

was commissioned by the State Health Planning and Development Agency in
conjunction with the Northwest Oregon Health Systems Agency and Eastern
Oregon Health Systems Agency.

The questionnaire was developed by the

Oregon State University Research Center.

Information was collected on

use of health services, insurance coverage, income, household
structure, health needs, health behaviors, and health satisfaction.
The sample was randomly drawn from noninstitutionalized adults
residing in the State of Oregon.

The sampling frame is estimated to

have drawn from 85% of Oregon households (approximately 95% of Oregon
households have telephone service, but approximately 11% of these have
unlisted numbers).75

Names were randomly selected from telephone

directories for each Health Services Agency area (HSA's 1,2 and 3).
total of 2,000

hous~holds

were selected,

How~v~r,

due to budget and

time constraints, counties in which 12 or fewer interviews had been

A
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scheduled were reallocated proportionately to larger, similar, nearby
counties (constricting selection of households to 26 of the state's 36
counties).76
Household interviews were conducted by telephone during June
1978.

Any available responsible adult was selected as the respondent;

the respondent was asked to provide information about each individual
household member and about the household as a whole.
averaged an hour in length.
necessary.

Each interview

As many as twenty callbacks were made, if

The completed sample of 1710 households resulted in a 73%

response rate. 77

Of the nonresponses, 59% (N=272) were refusals,

with the remaining 41% (N=189) being households that could not be
reached after repeated attempts. 78

Comparisons of age and sex

distributions for the sample are relatively similar to those for the
general population.

Differences for age groups between HSA 2 and the

1970 census are, while considerable, likely to have negligible effects
on data-based statistical estimates. 79
All surveys have limitations.

Telephone interviews, while

enabling more interviews with more kinds of households than possible
with face-to-face interviews, are less controllable.

This raises the

potential danger of nonresponse and lessens the interviewer's ability
to check the information's veracity.

The interviewer must accept

reported information without checking receipts or other written
information.

As with all survey types, when one respondent is selected

to report data for other household members, the additional danger of
selective perception or lack of accurate knowledge as to other members'
behaviors and health needs, etc., must be considered.
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In particular, the use of telephone listings as the basis for a
sampling frame may result in certain household types being under sampled
or not sampled at all.

Among these are the poor, the highly mobile,

and those without listed numbers.

The poor and extremely mobile are

estimated to constitute the majority of the 5% of households missing
from the sampling design. 80

Because households lacking telephone

service include the poorest of the poor who presumably face the
greatest obstacles to use of health services, findings of this study
may understimate the gravity of the hypothesized barriers.

Expected

differences between use patterns of Health Policy Gap households and
other households would then likely be also underestimated.
Methods of Analysis
Multiple methods of analysis were employed to examine the data
from several perspectives and to elicit descriptive information in an
intuitive extension of Webb, Campbell, Schwarz, and Sechrest's (1966)
me th 0 d

0f

t

·
l
'
81
r1angu
at10n.

Cross-tabular procedures were applied to

investigate the interrelationship of income, insurance, and source of
care.

Multiple linear regression and partial correlation methods were

used to select as control variables household characteristics highly
correlated with each measure of health services use.

Analysis of

variance and multiple classification analysis were used to develop
profiles of health services use.

These last techniques allowed an

examination of the relationship of each policy variable and health
measure, while applying increasing levels of statistical control.

The

initial bivariate relationship was studied in isolation; it was then
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studied while controlling for the other policy variables, and finally
while controlling for both the other policy variables as well as
selected household characteristics variables.
SUMMARY

The focus of this chapter was to develop a model to measure the
relative separate and combined barrier effects of low income, lack of
health insurance, and an inappropriate source of medical care on Health
Policy Gap households' use of health services.

A behavioral model of

health services utilization was proposed, and independent variables
were classified as either policy or control.

Finally, the hypotheses

were set forth and a description was given of the data source, sampling
limitations, and methods of analysis.
The next chapter discusses study findings on the relative barrier
effects of the policy variables, as well as the specific effects of low
income, lack of insurance, and an inappropriate source of care on
utilization profiles for householas in the Health policy Gap.
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CHAPTER III

PATTERNS OF UTILIZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES
BY HEALTH POLICY GAP HOUSEHOLDS
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is threefold:

to explore the causal

linkage between the policy variables (income, medical insurance
coverage, and source of medical care); to test the relative magnitude
of the policy variables' on use of health services; and to examine the
barrier effects of low income, lack of health insurance, and an
inappropriate source of medical care.
A temporal/causal order is assumed among the policy variables in
which income acts as an independent variable on insurance coverage,
which in turn acts on source of care (see Figure 12).

Within the

subset of policy variables, source of care is treated as a dependent
variable.

When the policy variables are entered into the larger model

developed in this chapter, source of care is treated as an independent
variable on the premise that at least part of its impact on use of
services is separate from that which is due to income and insurance.
The same reasoning applies to insurance coverage, which is considered
to be antecedent to income, yet precedent to source of care.
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SOURCE OF

MEDICAL

INCOME ----->~ INSURANCE -------:::>~MEDICAL CARE

Figure 12.

Causal model relationships of the policy variables of
income, medical insurance and source of medical care.

A behavioral model of health services

utilizati~i~

is constructed

to integrate the policy variables, measures of health services, and
selected household characteristics.

The latter includes factors such

as personal health behaviors, age, sex, and lifestyle stability, which
are associated with levels of health services use.

They are

incorporated into the model as statistical controls on the
relationship of the policy to the dependent use of measures.

This

avoids the problem of attributing observed levels of use entirely to
income, for example, when they may, in fact, be due to other factors
(such as excessive smoking).

The control variables include measures

of household structure, need for health services, residential
mobility, and health behaviors (see Figure 13).
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HOUSEHOLD INCOME
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')1 SERVICES USE

DENTAL
- Number of visits

MEDICAL INSURANCE COVERAGE
HEALTH NEED
- Health Conditions,
Health Rating, Satisfaction With Household
Health, Activity and BedRestricted Days

SOURCE OF MEDI CAL CARE

PHYSICIAN
- Number of Visits,
Use of Telephone
For Advice, Preventive Exams
HOSPITAL

RESIDENTIAL MOBILI'fY
- Hospital Inpatient
- Number of Years in
Dwelling Unit and
Community
HEALTH BEIfAV IORS
- Smoking, Drinking and
Regular Exercise

Figure 1].

Causal model of health services utilization.
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The study investigates six hypotheses.

The first explores the

causal relationship of income, insurance coverage, and source of
care.

The next two examine the relative effects of the policy

variables on use of health services.

The last three test the barrier

effects of low income, lack of insurance, and an inappropriate source
of care upon patterns of use.
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP OF INCOME, INSURANCE COVERAGE
AND SOURCE OF CARE
The introductory hypothesis is:
Low income is related to lack of medical insurance, which, in
turn, is related to an inappropriate source of medical care.
This hypothesis is explored by inspecting the association between
income and insurance coverage, and income and source of care.

The

relationship between insurance and source of care is then investigated,
with income held constant to ascertain whether or not insurance has an
independent effect on source of care.

The analysis begins by looking

at income, insurance, and source of care data.
Low income persons comprise 18.1% of the total sample (N=334l)
(see Table III); lower middle income persons ($10,000 to $14,999)
constitute 19.2% of the sample, and upper middle income persons
($15,000 to 24,999) make up 39.0%.

High income persons ($24,000 or

more) total almost a quarter (23.7%) of the sample.
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TABLE III

PERCENTAGE OF INDIVIDUALS BY MEDICAL INSURANCE COVERAGE
AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME
Insurance
Coverage

Less than
$10,000

$10,000 to
$14,999

$15,000 to
$24,999

$25,000
or more

Total

Non-Insured

18.7%

7.5%

5.7%

4.8%

8.2%

Insured

81.3%

92.5%

94.3%

95.2%

91.8%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

(605)

(641)

Total

(1302)

(793)

(3341)

(X 2=112.21, p=.OO)
Since all household members are considered to be insured even if
only one member reports coverage, the findings are likely to
overestimate the extent of actual insured among the sample. l
Despite this conservative bias, 10.1% of all Oregonians sampled report
no private insurance coverage (N=338).

When estimates of public

health insurance (Medicaid and Medicare) are included, the estimate of
persons totally without insurance drops to 8.2%.2
Within income classes, nearly one in five (18.7%) of the low
income live in households without insurance coverage, which is two to
four times the incidence of lack of insurance reported for other
income classes.

Only 7.5% of lower middle income persons, 5.7% of

upper middle income persons, and 4.8% of high income persons are not
insured.

The data reveals a positive relationship between income and

insurance coverage.

As income rises, the probability of a household's

having at least one member insured increases dramatically.
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Twelve percent of household members, or approximately one in
eight, reports an inappropriate source of medical care.
Within income classes, almost thirteen percent (12.5%) of the low
income, nearly fifteen percent (14.5%) of the lower middle income,
approximately twelve percent (11.8%) of the upper middle

i~come

and

slightly more than ten percent (10.1%) of the high income report an
inappropriate source of medical care (see Table IV).

No association

emerges between income and source of care.
TABLE IV
PERCENTAGE OF INDIVIDUALS BY SOURCE OF MEDICAL CARE
AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME
Source of
Usual Care

Less than
$10,000

$10,000 to
$14,999

$15,000 to
$24,999

$25,000
or more

Not
Appropriate

12.5%

14.5%

11.8%

10.1%

Appropriate

87.5%

85.5%

88.2%

89.9%

100.0%
(559)

100.0%
( 622)

100.0%
(1239)

100.0%
(751)

Total

(X 2=6.28, p=.099)
Insurance coverage and appropriateness of source of care are
connected (see Table V).

Twelve percent (12.1%) of the uninsured also

lack an appropriate source of care.
issued:

At this point a caution must be

inappropriate source of care may be due to the household's

inability to obtain insurance which enables it to secure an
appropriate source of care, or it may be due to the household's not
attaching importance to either insurance coverage or to source of
care.

That insurance coverage and source of care are related is
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evident:

almost one in four individuals (24.3%) in uninsured

households report an inappropriate source of care as contrasted with
only one in nine individuals (11.0%) in insured households.
TABLE V

MEDICAL INSURANCE COVERAGE BY USUAL SOURCE
OF MEDICAL CARE
Usual Source
of Medical Care

Medical Insurance Coverage
None
Insured
Total

Not
Appropriate

24.3%

11.0%

12.1%

Appropriate

75.5%

89.0%

87.9%

Total

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

(267)

( 3046)

(3313 )

(X 2=42.84, p=.OO)
The explanation that difficulty in obtaining insurance may cause
difficulty in securing an appropriate source of care is supported by
the data.

The relationship between insurance and source of care is

not affected by economic class.

Sixteen percent (16.3%) of low income

uninsured persons mention an inappropriate source of care as compared
with only 11.7% of insured low income persons (see Table VI).
Similarly, 34.3% and 28.9% of the upper middle and high income,
respectively, are found to have an inappropriate source of care as
compared with an appropriate source of care (10.4% and 8.9%).
Income, as hypothesized, is found to have a significant
relationship to insurance coverage.

Table III shows that persons in
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low income households are twice as likely to be uninsured as those in
lower middle income households, and almost three times as likely as
those in upper middle and high income households.

A possible

explanation is that higher income households contain employed adults
who obtain employment-related coverage for themselves and their
dependents, while adults in low income households tend either to be
unemployed or to work in jobs not offering employee health insurance
coverage (i.e., seasonal, domestic and/or minimum wage occupations).
TABLE VI

PERCENTAGE OF INDIVIDUALS WITH AN INAPPROPRIATE SOURCE
OF MEDICAL CARE BY MEDICAL INSURANCE COVERAGE
CONTROLLING FOR HOUSEHOLD INCOME
Inappropriate
Source of Care
by Household Income

Medical Insurance Coverage
None
Insured
Total

Under $10,000

16.3%

11.7%

12.5%

$10,000 to 14,999

18.2%

14.2%

14.5%

$15,000 to 24,999

34.3%

10.4%

11.8%

$25,000 or more

28.9%

8.9%

9.9%

Although income has no direct effect on source of care, it is
clearly related to insurance coverage, as are the effects of insurance
coverage on source of care.

More than two times as many of the

uninsured have an inappropriate source of medical care than do the
insured.

This finding persists even after possible income effects are

ruled out by inspecting insurance coverage and source of care within
income classes.

Almost one and a half times as many uninsured low
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income persons have an inappropriate source of care as do insured low
income persons.
RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF INCOME, INSURANCE AND SOURCE OF CARE
TO EXPLAINED VARIANCE IN HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZATION

The relative effect of income, insurance, and appropriateness of
source of medical care on use of health services are investigated in
the following hypotheses:
•

Income explains more variation in the utilization of health
services than insurance coverage or appropriateness of source
of medical care do; and

•

Income, insurance coverage, and appropriateness of source of
medical care explain the most variation in dental services
utilization, less for physician services utilization and the
least for hospital services utilization.

Income, then, explains more variation in the use of health
services than do insurance or source of care because of its primary
causal/temporal position within the subset of policy variables.

This

assumption has implications for policymaking; policy interventions at
earlier points in the causal process should have more encompassing
effects, both direct and indirect, on patterns of utilization than
intervention later in the process.

This early intervention should

produce more targeted results on services use. 3
Dental, physician, and hospital services vary in terms of the
control over use afforded consumers relative to providers.

The

household retains most control over the use of dental services, less
for physician services, and least for hospital services (see Figure 5).
Conversely, the provider controls most decisions over use of hospital
services, less for physician services, and least for dental services.
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The continuum of consumer-provider control over services use depends on
several factors, among which are the immediacy and seriousness of
health need and areas of decisionmaking traditionally assigned to
either the consumer or provider in the American health care system.
An

examination of the above hypotheses begins by the development

of a correlation matrix.

Zero-order correlations of dependent, policy,

and control variables are examined for high correlations (.6 and above)
to determine whether any control variables overlap enough to drop those
less theoretically useful and whether any dependent variables should be
collapsed into a common measure.

As can be seen by Table VII, none of

the dependent measures of health services hold more than 2% of their
variance in common, indicating that, even for submeasures of the same
health service, different factors may account for patterns of
utilization.

As a result of their dissimilarities, the dependent

variables are examined separately.
Income, insurance, and source of care have very low intercorrelations; the highest is .18 for income and insurance, with
approximately 3% variance commonality.

Although these correlations are

higher than for the dependent variables, none warrants the development
of a common measure, especially in light of their varying implications
for policymaking.
Household characteristics have generally low inter-correlations,
ranging from .00 to .61.

Age is moderately related to household size

(-.52) and to number of health conditions (.61).

Years in the

community is related to years in the dwelling unit, as expected (.54).
Submeasures of each category of household characteristics (structure,
health need, residential mobility, and health behaviors) differently
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predict the utilization measures.

Therefore, none are dropped.

Instead, the relationship of health services, policy variables, and
household characteristics are individually examined in a set of
regression equations.
Series of blocks of variables are entered separately for each
health service in the order of their theoretical importance.

The

policy variables are entered first to discern their contributions
(both separately and collectively) to explained variance for each
health service measure.

Then, in line with the behavioral model, the

household structure variables of age, sex, household type, and
household size are entered as a group in the second step.
Health need variables, found to be the largest predictors in the
literature on health services utilization, are entered as a group in
the third step.

These include the number of bed-restricted days due

to illness, number of activity-restricted days due to illness, number
of ill-health conditions, individual health ratings, and degree of
satisfaction with household health on the part of the respondent.
Residential mobility variables, number of years in the community,
and number of years in the unit are entered in the fourth step.
Finally, health behaviors which might conceivably affect use of health
services are entered.

Resulting regression coefficients (standardized

Betas) and cumulative coefficients of determination (R2) for each
measure examined are shown in Table VIII.
As anticipated, the policy variables do not have large Betas, nor
do they explain a large proportion of variation in each dependent
measure compared with the household characteristics.

Yet they remain

significant even after household and individual characteristics known
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TABLE VIII
rux:;RESSION BETAS AND CUMULATIVE R2
Health Services Measures

Independent Variables
~
t of
Visits

I.

Polic~

/I of
~

HosEital

phone Use

Exam

.10

- .08
.06

.10
.02

.06
.01

In-Patient

Variables

Income
Medical Insurance
Source of Care
Step 1: Cumul R Squared
II.

Ph~sician

.15
.03

-

•

.03

.05
.05
.05
.01

•

-

.05
.12
.04
.02

-

.03

Control Variables
Household Structure
Age
Sex
Type
Size
Step 2: Cumul R Squared

-

.03
.03
• 04

-

•

.05
.06

•
•

.03

.01

*
*
*
*
*

.35
.12
.12
.10
.05
.21

-

-

.15
.03
.04
.10
.07

-

-

.50
.11
.04
.14
.35

*

•

.09
.03

Health Need
Bed-Restricted Days
Activity-Restricted Days
Health Conditions
Individual Health Rating
Household Health Rating
Step 3: Cumul R Squared
Residential

.03

-

.03
.03
.12

*

-

.13

-

.03
.11

•

-

.11

.04
.13
.03

*

.37

.09
.13
.07

-

*

.05
.07

Mobilit~

Yrs in Community
Yrs in Dwelling Unit
Step 4: Cumul R Squared

*

.05
.03

•
•

.21

*

-

*

.10
.38

.05

*

.07

Health Behaviors
! Packs Cigarettes Smoked
Frequency of Drinking
/I Drinks at One Time
Regular Exercise
Step 5: Cumul R Squared

•

Not significant at p

*

.04

*

.07
.04

~.os.

*
*

*
*

.21

*

*

-

*

.04

.11

.03
.07
.09
.07
.40

*
*
*

.05
,07
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to be strongly related to use of health services are entered into the
equation.

The argument is made that the persistence of these findings

constitutes policy-mutable barriers to appropriate and equitable
utilization of dental, physician and hospital services.
The various Betas (standardized multiple regression correlation
2
coefficients) and cumulative R ,S are displayed in Table VIII.
Income is a significant predictor of use across all services.
Insurance and source of care are also statistically significant across
most services.
Dental Services
Income is the largest predictor among the policy variables of
dental services use, and indeed, of all independent variables entered
into the equation.

Its Beta is .15, compared with .03 for insurance.

Source of care is not a significant predictor for dental services
because dental and medical services are not generally obtained from the
same source in this country, with the exclusion of prepaid health care
plans such as Kaiser.

Altogether, both the policy and household

characteristics account for only approximately 4% of the total variance
in use of dental services.
Physician Services
All three policy variables are significant predictors of number of
physician visits.

Income has a negative relationship to number of

visits; i.e., those with low incomes tend to see physicians more
often.

Insurance coverage and an appropriate source of care are
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positively associated with number of visits to a physician.
variables have equally large correlation coefficients.

All three

Household

characteristics emerge, as expected, as strong predictors for the
number of physician visits.

This finding is especially true for the

variable of number of bed-restricted days.

Total R2 increases to

twenty-one percent of the explained variation in number of physician
visits.

The policy variables contribute a small but significant part

of the total explained variance.
Hospital Services
Income has a weak negative relationship to use of hospital
services (Beta

= -.05).

Insurance is the most powerful policy

predictor, with a Beta of .12.

An appropriate source of care is also

positively related to hospital services use, though of less importance
than insurance (Beta

= .04).
PATTERNS OF HEALTH SERVICES USE

The hypothesized barriers of low income, lack of insurance, and an
inappropriate source of care are predicted to depress use of health
services in the following ways:
•

Members of lower income households use fewer health
services than do members of higher income households;

•

Members of uninsured households use fewer health services
than members of households in which at least one person is
insured; and

•

Members of households without an appropriate source of
usual medical care use fewer health services than do
members of households with an appropriate source of care.
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Use profiles of Health Policy Gap households are drawn by
examining mean levels of use of each service (dental, physician and
hospital) by each policy variable (income, insurance, and source of
care).

For example, the profiles show the average number of times each

household member has seen the dentist in the past twelve months for
households of different incomes (see Figure 14).
Analysis of variance is employed to check for statistically
significant relationships (p=.05 or less) of the policy variables to
the dependent measures of services use.

It is also used to check for

interactions among the policy variables.

Multiple classification is

then applied, both to find mean levels of service use by each policy
variable and to sift out the effects of the control variables on the
dependent measures from the effects of the policy variables on the
dependent meaures.

In this manner, successive statistical tiers of

control are applied to the initial bivariate relationship of the policy
variable and the measure of use.
Each measure of services use is initially contrasted with each
policy variable and is then viewed again while controlling for the
effects of the other two policy variables.

Finally, the relationship

is tested holding constant the effects of the other two policy
variables as well as the selected household characteristics variables.
The latter are chosen on the basis either of having been found to
contribute most to the variation in the particular health service
measure, or of having been most effective in decreasing the zero-order
correlations of the policy variables with the dependent measures (see
Tables IX and X).
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Across all health services, members of Health policy Gap
households exhibit a distinct profile of use when contrasted with
profiles of other households.
Dental Services
Use of dental services is measured by the number of times
household members are said to have seen the dentist
during the past twelve months.

Household characteristics used as

control variables in the analysis include age of household member,
household type, residential mobility (number of years in the dwelling
unit), and frequency of drinking.

As anticipated, the policy variables

less directly related to use of dental services, medical insurance, and
source of usual medical care, do not significantly differentiate among
individuals' levels of service use (see Figure 14).
Those with an inappropriate source of medical care report an
average of 1.42 dental visits per year, versus 1.48 dental visits for
those with an appropriate source of care.

When the relationship is

adjusted for the other policy variables of incomp. and insurance, both
those with and those without an appropriate source of medical care
average of 1.47 dental visits yearly.

When both the other policy

variables and selected household characteristics are controlled for,
those with an inappropriate source of care average only slightly more
visits yearly (1.49) than those with an appropriate source of care
(1.

47) •
Uninsured persons report only 1.18 dental visits on the average,

compared with 1.51 visits for persons in households with at least one
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household member insured.

After adjusting for income and source of

care, the uninsured's average number of dental visits rises to
1.31, while the average number of visits of the insured remains
approximately the same (1.51).

The gap narrows further when household

characteristics are held constant.

Average number of dental visits for

the uninsured increases to 1.36, and insured individuals' dental visits
decrease to 1.48.

The difference is not statistically significant.

Use of dental services by income shows a positive and linear
relatio'nship.
rises.

As income rises, the mean number of dental visits also

The average number of dental visits for the low income is 1.10;

the average is 1.25 for the lower middle income, 1.54 for the upper
middle income, and 1.84 for the high income.

When source of care and

insurance are taken into account, this gap narrows to only 1.12 for the
low income, remains at 1.25 for the lower middle income and 1.54 for
the upper middle income, and drops only slightly to 1.83 for the high
income.
Even after controlling for selected household characteristics, the
low income average only 1.16 dental visits versus 1.22 for the lower
middle income, 1.53 for the upper middle income, and 1.81 for the high
income.

Clearly, the low income fall far short of other income classes

in their use of dental services.

The lower middle income also report

fewer than the average of 1.47 dental visits reported for the sample as
a whole.
Physician Services
Use of physician services is explored for three measures.

The
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first is the number of visits to a physician in the prior twelve
months,

Household characteristics used as controls include sex,

numb~~

of bed-restricted days due to ill health, number of activity-restricted
days due to ill-health, number of ill-health conditions, and overall
rating of each member's health.
The second measure is whether the household is reported as having
used the telephone to contact a physician for advice during the past
twelve months.

Household variables held constant in the analysis

include age, household size, number of health conditions, satisfaction
with household health, and, a report of regular exercise by at least
one household member.
The third measure is whether or not the household member is
reported as having had any of five preventive health exams (Pap smear,
prostate, blood pressure, blood sugar or breast exam) during the last
year.

Age, sex, household size, number of ill-health conditions, and

quantity of liquor consumption are control variables.
Income, insurance, and source of care all show different patterns
of physician services use.

Although insurance coverage is not

statistically significant for two of the three measures, and source of
care for none of the three measures, all policy variables decrease use
of physician services.
Income, insurance coverage, and source of care are all significant
demarcators of visits to the physician.

Persons in the sample visited

the physician an average of 3.40 times during the prior year.

Adjusted

for the effects of other variables, this statistic contrasts sharply
with the respective 2.99, 2.21, and 2.89 mean visits to the physician
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by the low income, the uninsured, and those without an appropriate
source of care.
The low income at first appear to use more physician services on
the average than any other income group.

They report a mean of 3.76

physician visits compared with 3.74 for the lower middle income, 3.41
for the upper middle income, and 2.84 for the high income as shown in
Figure 15.
The low income use even more physician visits when source of care
and insurance coverage are held constant.

Mean use climbs to 3.97

visits per year, while that of the lower middle income stays relatively
the same, visits by the upper middle income drop to 3.36, and visits by
the high income decrease to 2.76.
Initially, it appears that the low income overutilize services.
But when household structure and health need are considered, the
average number of physician visits by the low income drops
precipitously below that of other income groups.

They then average

only 2.99 visits, compared with 3.36 for the lower middle income, 3.69
for the upper middle income, and 3.24 for the high income.

Controlling

for household characteristics reverses the initial pattern of
overuti1ization by the low income to one of underuti1ization relative
to other income groups.
When physician visits are analyzed in terms of insurance coverage,
the gap widens.

The uninsured, even after adjusting for other

variables, still visit the physician only 2.21 times per year versus
the insured's reported 3.52 visits.

Lack of insurance constitutes a

greater obstacle to use of physician visits than do either source of
care or income.
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Source of care shows a pattern in which each successive level of
control applied to the bivariate relationship of the policy variable
and measure of use decreases, but does not erase, a significant gap
among levels of use.

Those without an appropriate source of care then

average 2.89 physician visits, as opposed to 3.47 visits for those
with an appropriate source of care.
Household use of the telephone for physician's advice is the
second measure of physician services.

Income and insurance coverage

(but not source of care) are statistically significant predictors of
this measure of use.

Thirty-eight percent of all persons reside in

households which have contacted the physician by telephone in the past
year.

After holding other factors constant, this figure may be

compared with the 33% and 34% of low income and lower middle income
persons, respectively, who have contacted a physician by telephone.
Of the uninsured, 34% report household use of the telephone for
physician advice compared with 38% of insured persons (controlling for
policy and household characteristics).

This figure decreases to 24%

for persons without an appropriate source of care, as opposed to 40%
for persons who report an appropriate source of care (see Figure 16).
The relationship remains stable even after increasing levels of
statistical controls are applied.
The last measure of physician services is whether an individual
has had one of five preventive exams (Pap smear, prostate, blood
pressure, blood sugar, or breast exam).

All three policy variables

are important in predicting reported exams.

Applying successive

levels of control to the relationship of the policy variable and use
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of exams measure categorically results in a reduction, but not
elimination, of differences among groups.
A pattern similar to that of income and physician visits is found
for preventive exams.

At first glance, the low income have a much

higher reported incidence of exams (56%) than do other income groups
(who range from 45% to 51%).

After holding other policy variables

constant, this pattern becomes even more pronounced. 4

Fifty-eight

percent of the low income then report having had an exam, while other
income group's use remains relatively the same.

But when household

structure, health need, and health behaviors are entered into the
equation, the pattern reverses itself:

the low income underutilize

exams relative to other income groups.

Exam use drops to 44% for the

low income, compared with 50-51% for other income groups as shown in
Figure 17.
An examination of insurance coverage and use of preventive exams

shows that 43% of the uninsured compared with 50% of the insured have
had an exam in the past year.
Levels of exam use by source of care also vary.

Forty-six

percent of those without an appropriate source of care have had a
preventive exam, compared with 49% of those with an appropriate source
of care.
Hospital Services.

Use of hospital services is measured by

whether any household member is reported to have been hospitalized
during the past year.

Household size, number of bed-restricted days,

number of activity-restricted days, number of ill-health conditions,
and satisfaction with household are the selected control variables.
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Income, source of care, and insurance are all significant
predictors of use.

An interesting pattern'emerges at this point

regarding income.

Use of hospital services, unlike use of other

health services measures, is described by a nonlinear relationship.
That is to say, reported use of hospital services does not
proportionately change as income changes.

Instead, hospital services

use peaks for the lower middle income and is lower for the low income,
the upper middle income, and the high income. 5 The low income
report a 30% probability of having had a household member hospitalized
versus 35% for the lower middle income, 31% for the upper middle
income, and 24% for the high income, even after holding all other
variables constant, as shown in Figure 18.
In this case, the low income have the same probability of having
a household member hospitalized as the general sample, and the high
income report a much lower probability than that of the sample as a
whole.

The latter finding may be attributable to the high income

group's ability to maintain ill household members within the household
or in alternative care institutions rather than as hospital
' t 'lents. 6
lnpa

The uninsured demonstrate the lowest probability (15%) of having
had a household member hospitalized, while the insured report a 32%
probability -- almost two times as high.

Persons without an

appropriate source of care have only a 25% probability of having had a
household member hospitalized, versus 31% for those with an
appropriate source of care.
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Low income, lack of insurance, and an inappropriate source of care
depress health services use.

The degree to which they act as barriers

varies by the measure of services use examined.
Income is the only policy variable found to significantly vary
patterns of dental services use.

The low income and the lower middle

income visit a dentist., repectively, only 1.10 and 1.22 mean times per
year, which is a sharp contrast to the 1.47 times a year reported for
the general sample.
Income, insurance coverage, and source of care all affect number
of physician visits.

The low income see the physician a mean 2.99

times per year, compared with the 3.40 visits for the sample as a
whole.

The uninsured see the physician an average of 2.21 times a

year, while those without an appropriate source of care report a mean
2.89 visits to the physician.

Lack of insurance is the highest barrier

to use of services, an inappropriate source of care is the second
highest barrier, and low income is the third highest barrier.
Household use of the telephone for physician advice is related to
all three policy variables.

Relative barrier effects for use of the

telephone are greatest for those in households reporting an
inappropriate source of care.

They use the telephone approximately

half as often as those with an appropriate source of care (24% versus
40%) •
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The uninsured and those with lower incomes also use the telephone
for physician advice less frequently than does the overall sample.

For

the sample as a whole, 38% of persons were reported as having contacted
a physician by telephone in the past year.

Thirty-three percent of the

uninsured and approximately the same percentage of the low and lower
middle income, by contrast, report their household as having contacted
a physician by telephone.
Low income, lack of insurance, and an inappropriate source of care
decrease the probability of persons having obtained preventive exams.
Almost half (49%) of the total sample report having had a preventive
exam.

Only 44% of the low income, 43% of the uninsured, and 45% of

those without an appropriate source of care report preventive exams.
The differences are small, but statistically significant.
Although all three variables are significant in predicting
differences in use of hospital services, 30% of the low income report
having had a household member hospitalized, which is equal to that of
the general sample.

Here, it is the high income category which

differently utilizes hospital services.

Only 24% report having had a

household member hospitalized during the past year.

This is surmised

to reflect the higher income populace's greater ability to maintain
supportive environments for household members in nonhospital
surroundings.
Nevertheless, the low income exhibit the second lowest use of
hospital services, with only 30% reporting having had a household
member hospitalized, compared with 35% of the lower middle income and
31% of the upper middle income.
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Lack of insurance is the greatest barrier to use of hospital
services.

Only 15% of the uninsured versus 32% of the insured have had

a household member hospitalized, even after other factors are
controlled for.
barrier.

An

inappropriate source of care is the second highest

Only 25% of those without an appropriate source of care have

had household members hospitalized during the past year, compared with
31% of those with an appropriate source of care.

Low income is the

third highest barrier to hospital use among the policy variables.
In conclusion, low income, lack of insurance, and an inappropriate
source of care are found to significantly depress use of almost all
health service measures examined, although the relative barrier effects
differ by type and measure of service examined.

Even after controlling

for the effects of the other policy variables and selected household
characteristics which might explain the relationship of the particular
policy variable and measure, these effects persist.

Low income, lack

of insurance, and an inappropriate source of care clearly function as
inequitable barriers to the appropriate utilization of dental,
physician, and hospital services by Health Policy Gap households.

84
ENDNOTES
IThe survey asked whether anyone in the household was presently
covered by a health insurance plan which paid any part of a doctor or
hospital bill. Survey Research Center, Data Users' Guide for 1978
Oregon Health Interview Survey, Oregon State University, Corvallis,
Feb. 1979 (p. 10, code book).
2An age proxy for Medicare coverage is used to adjust the
estimate of public insurance coverage. This is necessary because data
was not collected in the survey for this category of insurance. The
estimate is based on the almost universal availability of Medicare for
persons sixty-five years old or older.
3witness policymakers' reasoning regarding income versus inkind
transfers of food, housing, and medical care.
4Income and insurance coverage, as well as income and source of
care, are found to have significant interactions (sums of squares are
1.8 and 3.3 respectively, compared with 88.9 total explained sums of
squares). Although statistically significant, these interactions are
not large enough to change the clear relationship of income, insurance
and source of care on use of the telephone for physician advice.
5Small interactions of insurance with source of care and for
income with insurance with source of care are found for use of
preventive exams (sums of squares are 0.6 and 2.0 respectively,
compared with a total explained sums of squares of 296.7). Given the
small ratio of interaction to total explained sums of squares,
interaction effects are relatively unimportant.
6Interaction of income and source of care is significant for
hospital services. The interaction sums of squares is 9.9, almost
one-fifth of the total explained sums of squares (52.3). possible
confusion of the findings is thus more serious here than for physician
services in which the interaction terms amounted to a far smaller
proportion of total explained sums of squares.

CHAPTER IV

ACCESS WIDENING STRATEGIES AND
HEALTH POLICY GAP HOUSEHOLDS
INTRODUCTION
The current system of health care, it is contended, has only
survived as long as it has because of government intervention, which
has moderated the "disastrous effect of free market dynamics. nl

An

incremental movement towards increased regulation and planning has
attempted to make attainable the opportunity for social justice absent
in a health marketplace characterized by free trade and
competition. 2

From this perspective, health insurance (especially

national health insurance) is a major readjustment to the problems of
the free market in operation. 3

National health insurance has been

proposed by almost every administration since that of Franklin D.
Roosevelt.

In the past ten years, other private or local/state

government combinations of access to care strategies have evolved.
Alternative delivery systems (ADS) have been proposed in an attempt to
address the issues of cost containment, access to care, and freedom of
choice.

These include health maintenance organizations, preferred

provider organizations, independent practioners' associations, primary
care networks, and local and state brokerage concepts.
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This chapter will describe the characteristics of each approach and the
promises of increased access for households in the Health policy Gap.
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (NHI)
The politics of National Health Insurance (NHI) focus on the
legitimacy and desirability of governmental intervention into health
care.

Antagonists in the debate can be categorized as those who wish

to shift medical care financing from the private to the public sector
because they feel the private financing of medical care has led to
intolerable inequities and those who view government financing as
synonymous with government control and hence impersonal and inadequate
medical care.
Feder and Holahan (1980) assert that these polarized stances on
NHI frequently are not objective, reflecting instead,
Rideological predispositions towards private versus public
administration, dispersed versus concentrated authority, and
incremental versus radical change. n4
Large industrial unions such as the United Automobile Workers, as well
a~

a variety of liberal religious, service, charitable and consumer

groups, are advocates of NHI.

NHI antagonists range from provider

groups including the American Medical Association (AMA) and hospital
groups to the conservative Young Americans for Freedom. 5
Aside from basic ideological differences, the major focus of the
controversy over NHI has centered on the issue of cost containment.
The expansion of private insurance coverage has been accompanied by
significant increases in medical care costs, although cost escalation
began even before the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid.
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TO date, the expansion of health insurance, both private and
public, has lowered the out-of-pocket cost to consumers, thereby
improving the consumer's ability to pay for noncovered services; it
has also facilitated the flow of revenue to providers, especially for
fee-for-service providers. 6 Major changes in the health care system
have resulted. 7 More services covered by insurance are consumed,
and services have become more complex.

These changes, however, are

not uniform across all services; rather, they are concentrated on the
more costly, insurance-covered ones.

Consumption

shifted towards more expensive services.

p~tterns

have thus

To the extent this occurs,

spiraling costs are exacerbated.
Part of these cost increases reflect the rising cost of resources
and changes in service quality.

Part, however, reflect a monetary

transfer to providers above and beyond what might be considered
generally acceptable.

Price changes by providers account for over 40%

of increases in medical expenditures since 1950. Since the removal of
the 1971-74 cost controls, price changes have accounted for 78.3% of
the rise in health care expenditures. 8
NHI opponents argue that expansion of insurance coverage will
only exacerbate the recent growth in medical care expenditures.

They

argue that everyone will be adversely affected by inflated out-ofpocket care costs and that costs will rise exponentially for
government.

Since third party insurance already pays 94% of hospital

care expenses but only 61% of physician services' expenses, most of
this expansion would occur in physician services.

Some portion of

these services: it is argued, will cost more than their derived
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benefits warrant.

NHI opponents are also against diverting resources

from more productive activities into national health insurance because
they believe to do so would hurt the nation's economic health.
Finally, they oppose any growth of the federal budget that would be
associated with NHI.
Administrative and Fiscal Criteria
An

effective national health insurance program would improve

acceSs to care, while restraining total as well as individual medical
expenses. 9 ' One way in which to gauge the effectiveness of NHI is to
look at associated administrative and fiscal factors.

National health

insurance can be typified by administrative control, definition and
scope of benefits, or by fiscal criteria.

If the use of financing and

benefit provisions are used as base criteria, proposals for health
insurance may be separated into three categories:
1. Narrow coverage, minimal federal financial role;
2. Wide coverage, limited federal financial role: and
3. Wide coverage, large federal financial role. IO
Cost of an NHI can be analyzed by total cost of the program for
individuals, employers, subfederal government units, and the federal
government; by costs incurred by all levels of government; or by
federal cost alone.

Narrow coverage, minimal federal financial role

NHI's are characterized by an emphasis on catastrophic medical expense
coverage after large deductions and co-payments.
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Since 1974, the Long-Ribicoff-Waggonner bill, covering
catastrophic medical costs above a certain level, has been the most
widely known.

Other examples are the "major risk" proposal of Martin

Feldstein and the similar Brock bill.

Both of these would pay all

medical bills exceeding a certain percent of income, although the
latter would administer a. tax credit along the same lines.

President

Carter's National Health Plan also emphasized catastrophic coverage.
Catastrophic protection NHI proposals often provide other coverage,
typically to specific population segments such as the elderly, the
poor, or the very young.

11

Other proposals provide wider benefit and population coverage,
but still restrict the financing role of the federal government.
Plans may either be voluntary or mandatory for both employers and
individuals.

Mandatory plans are, in effect, a taxation of the

individual in a form that does not appear in the federal budget. 12
The American Medical Association's (AMA) Medicredit proposal is a
voluntary plan with extensive benefits for all Americans.

This

proposal would encourage coverage by the federal government's
extension of a tax credit for insurance premiums which would replace
the present medical expenses tax deduction to employers and
individuals.
The Consumer Choice Health Plan (CCHP), developed by Alain
Enthoven, uses a tax credit approach to provide (with private vouchers
for the poor) for the purchase of private insurance plans.
vary with income and actuarial risk category.

Credits

Credits would equal 60%

of the actuarial cost of a specified basic benefit plan in each

90

geographic area.

In contrast to the AMA plan, CCHP includes several

measures to prevent insurers from competing by denying or limiting
coverage to high-risk populations.
CCHP puts a special emphasis on sensitizing individuals to costs
as well as benefits in their selection of an insurance plan.
Competition is encouraged, not only in claims administration, but also
in the delivery of care.

Project Health of Multnomah County, Oregon,

was based on these principles.

Its success as a demonstration project

has led to development of a state health proposal to provide universal
coverage for all Oregonians.
A mandatory, wide-coverage, limited federal financial role is
seen in the Nixon-Ford administrations' Comprehensive Health Insurance
Plan (CHIP).

CHIP would have required employers with more than a

specified number of employees to provide insurance. Premium liability
would have been divided between employers and workers.

In an

aggregation approach, CHIP would have also included other groups of
individuals such as the poor and elderly via public plans to
effectively constitute a system of universal health insurance.
The Kennedy-Waxman bill is another attempt to cover all groups
through aggregation.

Relying on mandated private coverage, employers

would have been required to offer employees a choice among private
insurance plans.

Differing from CHIP, individuals not covered through

employment would have had access to those same insurance plans.
Wide coverage, large federal financial role NHI proposals include
the far-reaching Kennedy-Corman bill which proposes a federal monopoly
of the medical insurance business.

It seeks to establish a single
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national health insurance program for all Americans with broad
benefits and no out-of-pocket costs at time of service use.
envisions the

~argest

It

federal administrative component of all the

plans so far considered.

The federal government's involvement would

range from payment of claims to

all~cation

of a regional and locally

predetermined national health budget.
Administration of a NHI
National health insurance may be administered at the national or
state level, left to the open marketplace, or a combination of these
approaches.

13

The Kennedy-Corman Health Security Plan is the most

widely known proposal for a nationally administered plan.

The chief

advantage of a national approach is that uniform policies would be
equally applied to all citizens.

Equity would be enhanced by assuring

equal treatment of citizens in similar circumstances.

This was the

argument behind the enactment of a national Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program replacing state-administered public assistance
programs for the elderly and disabled.

Under a nationally

administered approach, either a centralized or a decentralized policy
could emerge.

Private administrative agents could be utilized for

specific tasks, as is the case with private insurer carriers under
Medicare.
Delegation of authority to state or local governments constitutes
the second approach.

Here, state and local governments could provide

a more flexible and tailored approach to their constituencies.
proposed to rely most heavily on state administration.

CHIP

States would
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have had the responsibility to operate insurance plans for the poor,
to regulate the insurance market, to license providers, and to set
rates of provider payments.

Of the three alternatives, the state

administration has received the least consideration, chiefly because
of general dissatisfaction with early Medicaid programs' widespread
variation in benefit levels, eligibility, and provider abuses.

State

responsibility could range from a continued role for health care for
the poor to a financing plan for the general population.
Under the third approach, private insurers would meet consumer
choice in a market model.
rely

o~

The Consumer Choice Health Plan proposes to

this model to provide insurance for almost all the

population.

The Long-Ribicoff-Waggonner bill would apply this

arrangement to all but the poor and elderly.
National administration of NHI does not assure an effective or
uniform implementation of programs, as witnessed by the variations in
Medicare and Medicaid implementation levels.

Lack of uniformity in

implementation may result from conflict over goals within as well as
between levels of government.

In national government, these conflicts

are exacerbated by the brief tenures of political executives, the
lobbying of bureaucrats by members of Congress and special interest
groups, and civil service regulations inhibiting effective or
.
t·lve adm··
.
lnlstratlve
per f ormance. 14
1nnova

Finally, the very

complexity of a national approach causes problems for managerial
control.

Responsiveness to individual needs often conflicts with

equity through uniformity.
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The state administration emphasizes responsiveness to constituent
preferences over national uniformity.

Because the state government

tends to be controlled by certain interest groups, it is often felt
that those groups not included in the power structure, e.g., racial
minorities and the poor, are harshly dealt with.
The competency of states to administer such programs has also
been questioned.

The nature of state constitutions and limited terms

of office often cause a fragmentation of authority.

However, through

administrative reform in the late 1960's and early 1970's, forty
states have instituted changes in government so as to enhance public
accountability, improve administrative capacity, and reduce the
control of interest groups.
The wide variation among states in administering the Medicaid
program have been also substantially reduced.

In 1970, Medicaid

expenditures per enrollee were eight to ten times as large in the most
generous state as in the least. IS

However, six years later, states

with the lowest per capita incomes no longer had the lowest levels of
Medicaid acute-care expenditures.

During this period, the rank order

correlation between per capita income and acute care expenditures fell
from .48 to .28.
Theoretically, at least, the competitive market allows
simultaneous satisfaction of different preferences, in contrast to the
intentional uniformity of a nationally administered system, or the
variation of state and local preferences in a state-administered
system.

In a market model, consumers compare benefits to costs in

their choice of a particular product or service.

Insurers under this
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model would offer an array of policies reflective of consumer
preferences.

Proponents believe the result would be a more responsive

and flexible system than could be offered by the federal government.
In practice, however, variations in purchasing power, compounded
by insurers' incentives to limit financial risk, have resulted in a
dual system in which employer-insured consumers enjoy relatively
low-cost comprehensive insurance coverage, while the remainder of the
population is at a serious disadvantage.

Employee groups are

generally younger and healthier than other population groups.

Because

of the competition between providers for employee group insurance, 75%
of full-time workers pay less for health coverage than do those unable
to obtain employee coverage.
NHI approaches illustrate the complexity and difficulty of
designing a system of health insurance to meet the criteria of
uniformity, equity of treatment, responsiveness to individual and
geographical needs, flexibility, and public accountability.

In

contrast to these massive NHI designs are numerous alternative
delivery systems, some of which combine source of care strategies with
insurance strategies, or governmental involvement in a competitive
market model.
TYPES OF ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY SYSTEM OPTIONS
Income, insurance, and source of care have been discussed as
isolated strategies to bring the low income population's use of health
services up to mainstream levels.

As with Medicare and Medicaid, each

could have massive and unforseeable effects on the health care
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system.

This section will discuss innovative methods of health care

delivery that minimize costs while providing models of access designed
to include those in the Health policy Gap.
Such alternative delivery systems (known as ADS), range from
health maintenance organizations (HMO's), prepaid Group practices
(PGP's), Independent Practioners' Associations (IPA's), Preferred
Provider Organizations (PPO's), and Primary Care Networks (PCN's), to
more universal integration of health delivery systems through Project
Health's seminal brokerage concept and its extension to the proposed
state Health Plan (SHP) of Oregon.
Recent ADS seem to originate with groups of providers, consumers,
and government at the grassroots level.

This is a sharp contrast to

the Medicaid and Medicare programs which were designed and
administered primarily at the federal level as an overlay on state and
local provider and consumer organizations and practices.

ADS arise in

response to delivery system inadequacies in dealing with cost
containment, access, and efficiency.

If organized by

provide~s,

they

often seek an improved competitive position relative to other forms of
alternative delivery systems within their marketing area.
Historically, health care cost containment measures have been one
of two types:

those which modify existing fee-far-service systems and

those which attempt to construct an alternative to those systems.
the latter, most approaches appear to be variants of the generic
health maintenance organization (HMO) exemplified by Kaiser'S
beginnings in the 1940's.

Of
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However, during the same period, a number of hybrid solutions to
rising medical' care costs appeared which do not fall neatly into
either fee-for-service or traditional prepaid practice categories, but
which promise to restructure the delivery of care.
made possible by the passage of the Omnibus

Many of these were

~econciliation

Act of

1981, which gave states far greater authority to pursue nontraditional
alternatives to health care delivery.16
These varying models of health care delivery systems differ in
several key respects, including enrollment options, the way in which
professional participation is channelled, whether or not enrollee
self-referral is allowed, the form of physician reimbursement, and
responsibility for cost containment (see Table XI).
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO's)
HMO's, initially developed as a means of providing medical care
to workers and their families, have grown continually through the
enrollment of employee groups.

They have a record of delivering

quality care at a reasonable cost to large populations and of offering
a complete ambulatory care that minimizes problems of socioorganizational access.
Organizational aspects of HMO's include a set of basic and
supplemental health maintenance and treatment services, voluntary
enrollment by groups of persons, and a capitation system in which the
HMO is reimbursed by predetermined, fixed, and periodic payment. 17
Both prepaid group practices (PGP's) and independent practioner's
associations (IPA's) are considered health maintenance organizations

TABLE XI
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COMPARISON OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
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Physician
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and are financed through capitation fees. The former is composed of
three or more physicians providing a defined set of
for a fixed periodic prepayment.

ser~ices

over time

A PGP differs from an IPA in that

physician participation in the former case is restricted through the
selection of a closed panel of physicians who are reimbursed on a
capitation or salary basis and who are held responsible for providing
medical care to enrollees.
working on-site.

Services are provided by physicians

No enrollee self-referral to other physicians is

allowed.
Kaiser is the most widely known of the PGP'S.

Originating in

California in the 1940's, Kaiser has since spread through the Western
United States.
The advantages and disadvantages of a PGP such as Kaiser are
related to its organizational aspects and their effects on the
consumer's access to and utilization of health care.

Access to care

is both inexpensive and covers a continuum of services from preventive
care to hospitalization.

Its disadvantage is that consumers are

locked into the Kaiser system, which constrains their choice of
providers.

For the poor, this may mean they must travel long

distances to Kaiser locations.

Because chronic illness and low income

are linked, many of the poor may value highly having a strong
relationship with one physician rather than a relatively impersonal
relationship of a panel of doctors available in a closed panel HMO.
Evidence indicates that enrolling Medicaid eligibles into HMO's
is difficult.

Potential enrollees seem to perceive the HMO option as

substantially reducing choice while appearing to be no better than
other available options.

However, when few other medical care
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alternatives are geographically available or access is limited by
provider preferences, the poor are willing to join HMO's regardless of
their quality.
New federal regulations limiting Medicare and Medicaid
enrollments in HMO's to a maximum of 50% may render it impossible for
PGP's to locate themselves so as both to serve the poor and nonpoor,
as the former often tend to be geographically isolated in economic
ghettos.
In contrast, independent practice associations were developed
between the 1940s-l960s and were sponsored by county medical societies
to block the entrance of closed panel health maintenance organizations
.

1nto the area.

10
J

They frequently kept fee-for-service

reimbursement, invited all county physicians to take part, and acted
to preserve a fee-for-service style of medical practice.
In contrast to the prepaid group practice, the traditional IPA
model stays within the fee-for-service system.
reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis.

Physicians are

Membership is often open to

all doctors within the community, and services are provided by
physicians in their offices.

The IPA is, in practice, more variable

than the PGP model in that self-referral is unlimited.
Primary Provider Organizations
Primary provider organizations are a response of traditional
health providers to increasing competition from HMO's and to physician
surpluses. 20

They follow a pattern of scattered provider groups

adapting to changes in their own regional health care delivery
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systems.

Although hospitals generally start PPO's to assure higher

occupancy rates of their facilities, physicians in at least one area
have organized a PPO with an emphasis on outpatient care in response
to employer interest in controlling outpatient use. 2l

The only

agreement binding participating providers and consumers is that each
time a designated service is provided, it is provided at an agreed
upon fee.
Since this approach is a variant of traditional fee-for-service
delivery systems, it shares certain common characteristics including
provider panels, negotiated fee schedules (often with discounted
reimbursements to participating physicians and hospitals), use or
claims review, some form of control mechanism, a practice of no
"lock-in" of consumers (i.e., consumers are not constrained in their
choice of provider), and administrative and marketing arms. 22
Administrative and costs advantages include the features of limited
risk for providers and discounts of usually 5-20%, consumer choice,
quick and cost-efficient claims processing, an emphasis on efficient
practices (such as utilization control reviews), flexible benefit
packages (i.e. consumer copayments! coinsurance! waived deductibles
for use of preferred providers), and low administrative costs.
Pr~ary

provider organizations offer several advantages.

Because

they are an extension of the fee-for-service system, they are often
more readily acceptable as a way of organizing service delivery to
achieve cost containment.

Satisfaction may also be higher because

consumers have the option of choosing a provider rather than of being
restricted, as is the case with closed panel M.D.'s.
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Incentives are used to shape consumer behavior.

Some of these

include the waiving of deductibles/copayments or co-insurance and the
increasing of benefits if consumers choose to receive care from a
preferred provider.

By discounting fees and monitoring use, providers

can increase their institutional occupancy rate in areas where there
is an oversupply of physicians or hospital beds, i.e., by making their
system of health services delivery more competitive.
Because most PPO's feature rapid turnaround on claims, provider
satisfaction is higher than in most other systems.

Providers are also

protected by the minimal financial risk built into the system for
providers who agree to the negotiated fee schedules.

Administration

of typical PPO claims is relatively routine, so the cost of claims
processing adds little overhead.
Payers (primarily employers or unions with Taft-Hartley Funds)
are initially attracted to PPO's by the expected cost savings from
discounted fees and the anticipated long range savings from
cost-efficient practices (such as utilization reviews).

The PPO

design also offers employers the advantage of maximizing their
influence over a group of providers through input into the allocation
of resources spent on providing health care services to employees or
union members.
The main disadvantage is that PPO's are only cost effective if a
ccmpetitive market exists and if employers and funds can effectively
monitor health care.

Wherever the consumer has access to traditional

fee-for-service medicine and PPO's with no HMO (or prepaid) option,
the consumer's leverage regarding the price of services is limited.
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The consumer is dependent on the PPO to practice cost efficiency in a
fee-for-service system.

In this system, costs passed on to the

consumer have historically risen faster than the total annual change
in the Consumer Price Index.
Primary Care Networks
In contrast to PGP's, IPA's and PPO's, primary care networks
(PCN'S), which were organized mostly within the past decade, have
three principal characteristics:
1) primary care physicians are disbursed throughout the
community in solo or group practices,
2) patients are enrolled in the PCN and assigned to a single
primary care physician, and
3) the network increases the primary care physician's control
over the total medical care received by the patient. 23
States are provided the flexibility to request waivers for the
establishment of PCN's through the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981
(P.L. 97-35), which recognizes the growing acceptance for case
management of long term and acute care.
In practice, PCN's can be very similar to HMO's in that the
primary care physician in both cases may be responsible for medical
and financial patient management; they differ in that PCN's do
restrict physician participation.

IPA's are at the other end of the

continuum with participation open to all local physicians.
The evolution and growing popularity of PCN's is the result of
three converging trends:

Blue Cross/Blue Shield's selective response

to HMO's in the 1970's, the growth and acceptance of family practice
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as a specialty, and a number of developments within Medicaid.
Pertinent Medicaid developments include recurring fiscal problems,
difficulties in defining mainstream medicine, questionable application
of the freedom of choice provision, a bias towards institutional care,
excessive outpatient use of emergency rooms and outpatient
departments, growth of lock-in programs, and' the relative success of
government funded neighborhood health clinics.

Another factor has

been the ability of California to replace its scandal-ridden Medicaid
system with a tightly controlled and sophisticated HMO system.
Unlike PGP's, PCN's employ both solo physicians and physician
groups and may also reimburse them on a fee-for-service as well as a
capitation basis.

PCN's, however, can be much more demanding than

IPA's in terms of prospective physicians seeking entry into the
network.

In contrast to lock-in programs, PCN's do not isolate

clients who have inappropriate behavior.

Instead, all consumers

select their own physician who manages their medical care.

The

central role of the primary care physician is the key distinguishing
characteristic of PCN's (see Table XI) •
The advantages of peN'S, especially for low income populations,
are several.

First, by making the primary care physician responsible

for medical and financial management of the patient, they greatly
reduce costs because although physicians' direct revenues account for
less than 19% of total expenditures, they control about 75% of total
health care costs. 24

An

example of an instance in which expenses

have been cut in this manner is the Health Maintenance Program of the
Wisconsin Physician's Service.

Evidence indicates that benefits
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offered by this PCN are more generous than Blue Shield's
fee-for-service package.

This is because processing low cost claims

under the latter amounts to at least half of the total cost of the
benefit.

Under capitation, these processing costs are eliminated.

The PCN approach may then offer states the means for substantially
increasing their low Medicaid fees to office-based physicians without
increasing their net costs for processing and reimbursing physician
services. 25

Other advantages are that they constrain patient misuse

of the system by locking all patients into a primary care physician,
guarantee clients an entry point into the system as long as the client
accepts the conditions of membership, and are more flexible and more
easily established than traditional HMO's because they do not require
new institutions or large alterations in the existing relationship
between physicians and hospitals. 26
One possible disadvantage of PCN's is that they may encourage a
reduction in the quality of care provided because physicians obtain a
greater fiscal return for greater volume of patient load than they
enjoy for providing ongoing comprehensive care for an individual
client.

Another potential problem is that primary care physicians may

be either unable or unwilling to supervise specialists.

Evidence from

the now defunct united Health Care of Safeco (ORC) indicates that one
of the prime reasons for its demise was that primary care physicians
often paid after the fact for specialist services not approved in
advance and seemed hesitant to question self-referrals by patients to
specialists. 27 Unless the primary physician is held responsible fer.
all care--not just primary care--the PCN has a strong incentive to be
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less efficient and more costly than fee-for-service.
foster adverse selection in either of two'ways:

PCN's may also

by selecting

potential enrollees from the healthiest of fee-for-service clients, or
by a systematic selection of a particular provider within the PCN by
clients who tend to be sicker than the main pool of potential
clients.

The latter occurs when clients who tend to use more services

or more costly services choose a specific provider more over other
providers on the basis of long-term patient-provider relationships,
geographic location, etc.

Finally, the administrative and

informational systems a state employs may not be appropriate or
adequate for PCN's because they often are designed for a traditional
fee-for-service system. 28
PCN delivery systems have included innovative approaches designed
to serve the indigent, sometimes attempting to integrate them into
mainstream health care.

Group Health Plan (GHP) of Northeast Ohio,

for example, has been termed a "bridge between the private and public
sectors."29

Begun in 1971 as one of eleven networks designed to

provide care to the poor, GHP has successfully integrated both
indigent and nonindigent populations into a system serving
approximately 24,000 members.
recipients.

Approximately 9,000 are Medicaid

The remaining 15,000 are covered under private group or

government agency contracts.

A client may move from Medicaid to

employer-covered status within the program, preserving his or her
insurance carrier and selected physician.
Because of its origins, GHP does not have to answer to county
medical associations and can focus on building a plan acceptable to
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its member physicians and subscribers.

This increased freedom and a

heavy emphasis on computerized monitoring of relevant data are key
components of GHP.
Physician incentives and constraints aid in controlling physician
and system risk while assuring quality care for clients.
mechanisms limit physician risks. 30

Three

These include an approach to

catastrophic losses wherein medical practice groups are insured
against lost costs above a certain level incurred by any individual
GHP member, insuring that the physician will not drop a patient once
he or she becomes expensive to serve.

Medical groups are also

rewarded by half the difference if actual per member month hospital
expenditures are less than projected per member month projected
hospital expenditures.

Furthermore, if during a 12 month period, the

cost of services exceeds more than 150 percent of a medical group's
capitation fee, GHP will extend a short-term interest free loan,
acting to reduce risks by allowing the group to carry forward their
losses and offset them against future profits.
A special emphasis on reducing health costs without reducing
quality of care for the indigent is the hallmark of the Massachusetts
Case Management (MCM) demonstration project.
recipients are enrolled in the plan.

Ten thousand AFDC

In this project, case management

providers coordinate enrollees' total care. 3l
To date, the success of the project has been hindered by three
factors:

1) at some sites patients can receive unapproved care

elsewhere and they have done

so~

2) risk to providers either does not

exist or is so limited that it has had no effect on incentives for
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efficient practice; and 3) neither the state nor certain sites have
data systems capable of implementing and monitoring a case management
project.

Administrators conclude that the program would be more

effective if the following were to occur:
•

case management is operated out of free-standing clinics
and offices, because use of outpatient clinics in tertiary
care hospitals creates conflicting goals;

•

data systems are developed prior to the project's
beginning;

•

patient education necessary for both marketing and
appropriate system use is encouraged:

•

patients are locked into one primary care physician who
bears financial and medical responsibility for managing
all the patient's health needs:

•

quality of care is reviewed and monitored (with state
access to records);

•

sites are accessible to client on 24-hour basis, with time
allotted for walkins; transportation is provided if
necessary.32

Project Health's Brokerage Concept and Multicare
Multicare, a public PCN in in Multnomah County, Oregon, has grown
out of the experience of project Health.

The latter is a

demonstration project pooling public funds and brokering private
providers' health plans to provide health insurance to a medically
indigent population.

The two major concepts behind Project Health are

important in understanding

Multicare's functioning:

1) Multnomah

County pools all available health resources (including county funds,
Public Health Service 330 grants, client payments and provider
refunds);

2) the county, acting as a broker, negotiates prepayment
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contracts with prepaid health plans and, until recently, had an
episodic payment plan for office visits to physicians and for offering
limited hospitalization coverage.
Project Health claims that it allows the consumer freedom to
choose among participating providers, involves and sensitizes
consumers to cost by requiring copayments and premiums, and stimulates
competition among health providers.

It integrates fragmented public

programs by pooling resources, encourages cost containment through
prepayment, and approximates a voucher method of providing health care
coverage by offering enrollment in competing health plans to eligible
individuals and assisting them in making choices.
Project Health pays a portion of the premium, (similar to an
employer) based on the client's income, family size and selected
Plan.

33

Both HMO and IPA providers are involved.

However, in one

instance because of adverse selection by high need clients of the
health plan with a flexible IPA arrangement, capitation rates have
been found to be insufficient to cover costs.

Another health plan

found it necessary to substantially increase its premium and close
enrollment to Project Health enrollees for an extended period of time.
Adverse selection has occurred in Project Health, because the
sickest from that population have preferred health plans with an open
physician panel.

Also, because the poor have been responsible for a

portion of program costs, those without immediate need have tended to
drop out while the chronically ill have stayed, causing average per
person costs to rise dramatically.34
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project Health has responded to these problems by screening for
health status and placing high risk clients into the county's case
management system called Multicare.

Multicare is a joint venture

between county operated clinics and private providers with a broad
range of services but with all preventive and primary care occurring
in the county clinics.
Health care plans are developed for each patient by a case
manager, who authorizes and approves all care.

Referrals are limited

to specialists not available at the clinics who are carefully screened
for high levels of cooperation, high-quality service, and
cost-sensitivity.

Providers are selected based on Project Health

experience, establishment of referral provider panels, and ability to
work with community providers.
The major difference between Multicare and most PCN's is that
once a high risk client's needs are met, that client is allowed to
choose whether to remain in Multicare or to enroll in one of the other
HMO'S in Project Health.

Evidence shows that a very small proportion

of the Medicaid eligible population uses a disproportionate amount of
funds.

Screening out this population and handling their health care

in a more efficient system has important possibilities for cutting
costs for states' Medicaid programs. 35
Proposed State Health Plan (SHP) for Oregon
The proposed State Health Plan (SHP) of Oregon extends the
seminal brokerage concept exemplified by Project Health to cover all
Oregonians. Its goals are to contain health care costs without
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increasing current levels of expenditures by altering consumers',
providers' and employers' economic incentives.

The plan would employ

health insurance pooling to guarantee a minimum level of comprehensive
coverage at reasonable cost. 36

Consumer choice, prepayment for

guaranteed comprehensive benefits, and coverage for all Oregonians are
the key components of the plan.
provide

Estimates indicate that SHP could

a comprehensive level of benefits to all Oregonians for

approximately $1.53 billion dollars. 37

This figure compares

favorably to Oregonians' 1980 expenditures of $2.6 billion for health
care.

The latter figure includes only partial health care costs

provided under the existing system.

(Only 59% of Oregonians are now

estimated to have comprehensive health coverage.

At least 12% are

estimated to have no health coverage whatsoever.)
The importance of universal coverage for all Oregonians is
discussed by an SHP staff member in a memo to Don Clark, Multnomah
County Commissioner:
Equal access to health services for all Oregonians can only
be achieved if all residents of the State are eligible to be
enrolled in a plan which provides an established minimum
level of benefits. The ability to enroll residents in a plan
with comprehensive benefits at a reasonable cost can only
occur if everyone is enrolled and the risks associated with
treating illness and maintaining health are shared across the
entire population. Further, if access to benefit coverage is
to be continuous, eligibility and enrollment must be separate
from financing of the system. 38
Under this plan, all Oregon residents would be eligible for
comprehensive health care benefits, including physician, hospital,
ancillary services, and limited dental and alternative care services.
Medicaid and Medicare benefits would be provided for, but administered
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separately.

All Oregonians would be obliged to choose a health plan from

offered options.
The SHP program would be financed through federal and state
revenues, an employer payroll tax, and limited consumer contributions.
These monies would be funneled into a State Health Financing Fund, which
would be administered by a fiscal intermediary.

Development of organized

health plans would be encouraged by state revenue bonding and protection
against unreasonable financial risk through reinsurance.

In areas where

privately sponsored plans are not spontaneously generated, or in the
event existing plans are inadequate to serve low income populations, SHP
might be expected to sanction a publicly-provided health plan. 39
NHI, ADS and Health policy Gap Households
National health insurance and alternative service delivery models
offer much food for thought relative to access, cost containment and
preservation of freedom of choice for providers and consumers.

These

proposals have varying potential for the access of Health policy Gap
households to health care.
Many ADS models and NHI proposals do not directly address
existing gaps in health coverage.

Instead, various models either

incrementally add groups of covered persons with different
characteristics, or simply choose to ignore existing gaps and focus on
more efficient service delivery to those already in the health care
system.

For example, castrophic NHI proposals basically cover only

those households in desperate financial straits from illness
expenditures above a certain level.

Other needy groups may be added
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on in an aggregative approach in various plans.

Primary provider

organizations are more aware of the need for more efficient delivery
of the existing fee-for-service system to those already eligible for
coverage within that system.
Prepaid group practices and independent practice associations,
although within the capitation model, tend also to focus on the status
quo system of health services delivery.

They negotiate to deliver a

certain set of services to a prespecified group of people for a fixed
prepayment, but do not specifically deal with the provision of health
services to those not already served by the system.

Those who are

presently not served or who are under served by the system are
invisible clients.

They are hidden behind the barriers of low income,

lack of insurance, and an inappropriate system access point of entry.
Health maintenance organizations have the capacity, as do many of
the other organizations discussed, to pull into the HMO a certain
proportion of the under served "high risk" population.

As demonstrated

by the HMO projects, the poor, as well as the employer-insured, may be
served within a capitation system.
However, HMO performance in the area of enrollment of the poor
has had different long-term results than the demonstration project
indicated.

This may be largely due to differences in

participation. 40

incentives for

Because many of those enrolled in Medicaid move in

and out of eligibility for assistance, tracking problems are immense.
The problem of determining eligibility and use patterns by the poor is
not, however, limited to organizational aspects of the HMO system in
which the poor are served: rather it is the result of nonflexible
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eligibility requirements of the Medicaid program and lack of an
integrated health care system.
Primary care networks form a model that has been used with
relative success for publicly-insured populations.

The degree of

success has depended on the primary care physician's fiscal and
managerial skills.

Multicare of Multnomah County, Oregon, is an

example of a highly successful primary care network.
What the majority of these approaches lack is a vehicle (e.g.,
insurance coverage) to enable the low income access to these health
services delivery systems.
impossible feat.

Accessibility for these people is not an

Project Health of Multnomah County, Oregon, for'

example, translated a model of marketplace consumer choice into a
highly acclaimed mainstrearning project for the majority of medically
indigent.

This project contained a special proviso program,

Multicare, for high risk individuals who would have otherwise put too
heavy a burden on providers.

The extremely successful outgrowth of

Project Health has been a State Health Proposal for Oregon.
This proposal brings the seminal concept of consumer choice in a
broke red model of pooled resources and providers to full bloom.

A

universal and mandated system of access and health insurance coverage
is envisioned for all Oregonians within a state-administered and
monitored system of private providers.

Estimated to be less expensive

than the current fragmented system, it also would provide a fuller
range of preventive, medical, and supplementary health services
(including dental care).
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CONCLUSION
Problems exist in making the health care system more responsive
to the needs of disadvantaged populations.

First, the existing system

does not respond to any demand that is not stated in dollar terms.
Second, the high risk factor and higher administrative costs
associated with disadvantaged populations make them unattractive to
private providers seeking to establish a better competitive position
in the marketplace.

Third, the quality and volume of services

utilized by the disadvantaged may not be equivalent to mainstream care
enjoyed by the privately insured.
Under the present system, however, certain categories of the poor
do gain access to the health marketplace via public insurance or
through targeted health delivery systems (such as Maternal and Infant
Care projects).

Remaining low income groups are put at an even

greater disadvantage.

The increased demand on the health delivery

system, associated spiraling inflation, and increased costs of care
associated with insurance expansion create a tripartite health system
in which the privately insured are assured of mainstream care, the
publicly insured get care, and the uninsured poor are pushed aside.
Such is the case when the disadvantaged are essentially left to find
their way in the private marketplace as a result of the withdrawal of
federal monies and the concurrent inability of state and local
government to cover the gaps between health needs and available
resources.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
OREGONIANS IN THE HEALTH POLICY GAP
Income, medical insurance, and source of medical care make real
differences in the

~.,ay

Oregonians use health care.

The majority of

households have "mainstream" access to health care services in this
state.

But for those ten to twelve percent of state residents who do

not have mainstream access to health care, this study finds that low
income, lack of insurance or an inappropriate source of care function
effectively as barriers to appropriate use of health services.
affected by these three

ba~riers

other Oregonians, even given thp

Those

use fewer health services than do
~ame

level of need.

The barriers also

contribute to serious inequities in access to health care for
Oregonians.
These inequitable effects on the health of disadvantaged Oregon
households are, without doubt, intensified by the precipitous rises in
unemployment and the closing of industrial and commercial concerns that
had employed large numbers of heads of households in this state since
the data for this study were collected in 1978.
unique to Oregon.

This situation is not

It supports national findings that a large number of

of all Americans are without appropriate health care access due to
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barriers amenable to policy intervention by decisionmakers at the
federal, state and local level.
Often these findings are initially hidden by the effects of
varying household characteristics which affect health services use
profiles.

Household structure (members' ages, sex, and size and type

of household), health care needs, mobility, and health behaviors
obfuscate or even hide these differences in services use among those of
different incomes, those with varying insurance coverage, and those
with atypical sources of medical care.
Income and insurance make up the greatest barriers to appropriate
use of health services by households in the Health Policy Gap.

The

third policy variable, source of care, shows small but significant
differences in the way in which members of households use different
health services.
The effect of source of care on use of medical services seems to
be a function of both the prior causal variables of income and
insurance as well as a certain unique effect on medical services use
that is either

ve~y

small or is not finely enough measured to produce

large "barrier" effects.

This may result from the confounding of use

patterns by different subgroups, i.e., extremely healthy or
higher-income individuals who don't believe in medical care may use
less services as do individuals facing income, insurance, or source of
care barriers.
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Relative Importance of The policy Variables
Lack of income creates the largest of the policy barriers to use
of dental services by Oregonians.

Those in the disadvantaged category

saw the dentist approximately once a year compared with the twice a
year visits typical of the general populace.

A linear relationship

exists between dental services use and income class, with both upper
middle and high income persons consuming more dental services than do
the general population.
Because only a small percentage of insurance covers nonmedical
health services (such as dental), the connection between insurance and
dental services use is nebulous.

Kaiser is one of the few insurers

which also provides dental services.

Medical insurance and source of

medical care are assumed to affect dental services use only if a causal
link between general patterns of consumer behavior and all types of
health services use is posited.

This link would be necessarily based

on underlying variables connected to both source of medical care and
medical insurance and dental services use.

Little or no variation in

use of dental services was expected by either medical insurance or by
source of medical care.
As expected, all policy variables (income, insurance and source of
medical care), were significant predictors of physician visits.

Among

these, lack of insurance was identified as the greatest barrier to
visiting a physician.

The uninsured reported fewer visits, while the

insured reported more than the average number of visits for the sample
as a whole.

The uninsured saw a physician at more than one and a half
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times the rate that the uninsured saw the dentist (3.52 versus 2.21
times during the previous twelve months).
An

inappropriate source of care was the next largest barrier to

visiting the physician.

Those with an inappropriate source of medical

care (either a public health clinic, a hospital emergency room, or
without a regular source of care) reported fewer visits than did those
with an established relationship with a practitioner.

Those reporting

an appropriate source of care tended to see a physician almost three
and a half times a year versus less than three times for those without
an appropriate source of care.
Income showed a curvilear function for this measure of physician
use, with an increase in mean numbers of visits to the physician as
income level rose and then a slight drop in visits for the high
income.
Mean use of the telephone varied most by source of medical care.
Members of households without an appropriate source of care reported
only about half as many telephone calls for physician advice as did
those in households reporting a physician's office as a regular source
of care.
Next in

i~portance

for telephone use was income.

Only a third

(33%) of members of low-income households had telephoned a physician
for advice during the past year versus forty-three percent of high
income households.

The relationship between income and use of the

telephone was linear and positive.
Only medical insurance coverage was unrelated to telephone use.
Having a regular source of care apparently ensures a closer contact and
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monitoring of consumer needs than does the more transitory
provider-consUmer relationship achieved through the emergency room or
public health clinics.
Low income, lack of insurance and an inappropriate source of care
slightly depress the probability of having received a preventive exam
by members of Oregon households.

Members of households with low

incomes, those without insurance coverage, and those reporting either
an inappropriate source of medical care or no source of medical care
all had slight but statistically significant lower mean levels of
preventive exams such as Pap smears, breast, prostate, blood pressure
and blood sugar.

These were below the average level of exams reported

for the sample as a whole.
The biggest difference between mean levels of use of hospital
services was for those without medical insurance.

They averaged only

half the probability of insured of having been in the hospital during
the prior twelve months, even after controlling for household
characteristics such as health care needs.
The next greatest deviation from mean levels of use of hospital
services was for members of households without an appropriate source of
care.

Since the possible effects of varying levels of health need were

controlled for in the analysis, source of care was found to have a
channeling effect on use of health services beyond that attributable to
differing levels of health needs.
Interestingly, the disadvantaged used hospital services at least
as frequently as did the upper middle income class.

The lower middle

income class used hospital services the most, and the high income
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category used them least.

The latter finding may be a function of

higher income households having more options for extended care needs
than use of hospital days (e.g., obtaining other sources of nursing or
chronic treatment facilities).
A curvilinear function was found for income, as was the case for
physician visits, with the very high income category using slightly
less than either the lower middle or upper middle income.

However,

while for physician visits the low income still used fewer services
than did other income groups, this was not the case for hospital
services.

If hospital services use is ranked by the probability of a

household having had a member in the hospital during the past year, the
upper income used the fewest hospital services, followed by the low
income, the upper middle income and finally the lower middle income who
were the highest users of hospital services.
When general patterns were examined across health services
measures,

income and appropriateness of source of care were found to

be significant predictors across all medical measures, including number
of physician visits, use of the telephone for physician advice, mean
use of preventive exams, and hospital services.
Suprisingly, insurance was a significant predictor for only three
out of four medical measures (number of physician visits, preventive
exams and hospital services).
telephone for physician advice.

It seemingly had no effect on use of the
At least for dental services use,

income alone among the policy variables was significant in predicting
use of dental services.
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INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR POL!CYMAKERS
What are the implications of a study in which findings emerge that
indicate various services are differently affected by income, insurance
or source of medical care?

One significant implication is that the

health delivery system needs to be tailored for different services.
If one policy objective were to be the increased use of physician
services, insurance would be emphasized more than income strategies,
based on the findings of this research.

Conversely, if the objective

were to be the decreased use of hospital services for preventable health
needs, policymakers might choose a strategy of investing in preventive
exams via insurance, source of care, and and income combinations in lieu
of the same resource investments in hospital services.
Certainly, specific strategies aimed at increasing use of certain
health measures conceivably would be more cost efficient and more
beneficial to the consumer than investment in other strategies might be.
The first task is to decide whether one type of intervention--income,
insurance, or system delivery strategy would best accomplish the
objective of increasing utilization rates across the board for persons in
the Health Policy Gap.
Single Intervention Strategies
Income.

Income is the first link in the causal chain hypothesized

to affect use of health services.
measures examined.

As shown, low income depresses all

Rationally, it is the primary strategy which must be

used to raise use of health services by the disadvantaged to mainstream
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levels.

Proposals such as the negative income tax (NIT) have been

attractive to policymakers because they offer the chance to eliminate the
multiplicity of narrow categorical programs that now exist with their
confusing array of eligibility requirements, administrative details, and
cross-purposes.
A universal income strategy leaving consumption aspects within the
household's domain of decisionrnaking avoids the pitfalls of paternalism
as well as eliminates the major problems involved in devising,
implementjng and monitoring complex policy combinations.
Income strategies may vary from piecemeal categorical programs such
as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to comprehensive
income-assurance programs that protect all Americans against potential
income level breaks, (whether episodic or chronic).

Benefit levels may

vary from a minimal survival level to adequate though not luxurious
levels with commensurate increases in cost and decreases in political
support from taxpayers.
However, one major problem is that there are likely to be
substantial differences in the impact of means-tested transfers and taxes
on the work effort put forth by different groups.l

Although the New

Jersey NIT experiment found no evidence of adverse work incentives,
Feldstein (1977) attributes the lack of findings to the short term nature
of the experiment, to the lack of effects on the supply of

par~-time

jobs

because of the small number of participants involved, and to peer group
pressures for work effort maintenance that would not exist were the
program universal.
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Income intervention strategies such as President Nixon's Family
Assistance Plan (FAP) would affect all aspects of consumption of goods
and services, including health purchases, by affected households.
Effects on

hous~hold

behavior vary in direct relation to the specific

details of the proposal and the current economic realities in the
marketplace.

A policy strategy entirely successful in one economic time

and place may be a complete catastrophe in another.
The second major problem concerns the effects of a straight cash
health insurance transfer on household consumption behaviors.

An in-kind

program (as opposed to a cash transfer program) may be desirable even if
a general negative income tax were enacted.

This would result if society

placed a higher value on certain health consumption expenditures not
valued as highly by the individual household.

For example, under a cash

transfer program, a household may choose to not invest in preventive
health services.

Instead it may prefer to invest more of its limited

resources in shelter, food, clothing, or even luxuries.

This is, in

part, an outcome of the unexpected and often involuntary nature of health
services consumption.

Households are loathe to believe that they may

need to save for future potential catastrophic illness, especially for
medical services.

In-kind programs (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid) tend to

direct household behaviors into the desired areas of consumption as
valued by society.
Given the unpredictable timing, costs, and unpleasant nature of
future illness, it is very unlikely the household will adequately provide
for its future health care needs.

Indeed, in the short term, it is to

the advantage of individuals to not invest in health services,
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particularly preventative health se=vices thereby delaying both health
expenditures and potentially frightening or painful treatments as well as
anxiety-heightening knowledge of their personal state of health.
Such households will inevitably become a fiscal burden on local,
state and/or federal government.

Resulting costs are shifted to the

public sector, whether by write-offs at local hospitals, downward income
shifts which place the household into eligibility categories for public
assistance, or, as the household ages, dependency on Medicare.
However, the economic reality is that a minimum income strategy
would not enable assisted households to effectively compete in today's
health marketplace so long as the present system of health insurance
remains unchanged.

Households would be unable to effectively function in

the health market because increased demand from the publicly insured and
inflationary cost increases make a minimum income supplement inadequate.
This situation is worsened by the lack of provider motivation to respond
to a need that cannot be stated in dollar terms.
Buffering or brokering agents would necessarily have to be placed
between assisted households and providers, thereby overlaying an
insurance strategy on top of an income strategy.

Furthermore, the

overwhelming hostility to any such proposal in today's political and
economic climate makes consideration of a universal income strategy
practically impossible.
Health Insurance.

Insurance is the second policy mutable key to

enhancing m9dical services use.

Lack of insurance significantly

depresses utilization for most health services.

If income strategies are

politically unfeasible, insurance emerges as a means to overcome the
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barrier effects of inadequate income as well as existing insurance
barriers.

Considered as an intervention measure, it offers the advantage

of greater political acceptability than do income interventions, while
retaining most of the benefits of choice in the consumer-provider
relationship.
Insurance strategiE!s may range from catastrophic limited coverage
with large out-of-pocket

~ontributions

(or ceductibles) on the part of

the consumer, or to a comprehensive floor under all Americans for
preventive, diagnostic, prescriptive, and catastrophic long term coverage
of health care costs with minimal out-of-pocket consumer contributions
(e.g., the Kennedy-Corman legislation).
various strategies have been developed, among which are innovative
attempts by local and state governments to combine state, local, and
federal monies to illustrate brokering approaches.

The focus of these

efforts is to provide increased access to medical care for indigent
populations.

One such outstanding effort is Project Health in Multnomah

County, Oregon.
project Health, previously a federal demonstration project,
illustrates the strengths of brokering approaches in increasing the
access of the disadvantaged to the present health system.

This is

accomplished by designing new combinations of coverage through a central
agent, which more equitably pools resources and divides high risk cases
across among health care providers.
Findings of Project Health have provided a data base with which to
design a state health insurance plan for the state of Oregon.

This plan

would cover all Oregonians under one umbrella brokering plan, providing
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an adequate level of access to health services for all Oregonians,
minimizing costs to providers as well as consumers, and increasing
participation of new health insurers.
Delivery System Strategies.

The third type of single policy

strategy would be that of changing the source of medical care to increase
the access of persons in the Health policy Gap.

An

inappropriate source

of medical care is a significant barrier, as hypothesized, to utilization
of medical services, even after controlling for insurance, income and
household characteristics.
Delivery system access mechanisms have been developed most often in
response to the health needs of narrow targeted groups of persons, often
focussing on a specific health need, such as children's preventive and
remedial dental care.

These mechanisms vary in scope from local

demonstration projects to community-wide, regional, or even state-wide
delivery sources that seek to ensure that accessibility is minimally
affected by system entry point, distance, transportation, or geographical
barriers.
Delivery approaches have had relative success.

Community health

centers and maternal and infant care programs such as WIC (Women and
Infant Care) have provided community outreach to geographically
centralized and categorically identifiable target populations.
Unfortunately, many of the episodically or chronically low income people
who make up a large portion of the Health policy Gap do not live in
centralized areas, nor do they represent an easily identifiable target
grouping.
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National health insurance proposals have not been able to overcome
the pressures of strong interest groups and conservative ideologies to
date, although they continue to be a strong focus of interest to
policymakers.

Alternative Delivery System models, developed at the

grassroots level, show promise for innovative combinations of marketplace
competition, consumer choice, and government oversight.
The relative strengths of single source policy interventions--either
income, insurance, or source of care--are inadequate to tailor specific
service increases or decreases.

However, of the three, income strategies

have the most potential for efficiently increasing access to health care
systems for persons in the Health Policy Gap across all services.
Insurance and source of care strategies rank second, due to their limited
impacts on medical services use.

As this study shows, for specific

services, either insurance or source of care strategies better target use
than do income approaches alone.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY DIRECTIONS
In economic periods of radically increased unemployment, a faltering
of the national economy, and pervasive anxiety about the future, the
public tends to be more cognizant of the insurance aspects of social
spending as being potentially necessary to their welfare.

It remains to

be seen whether or not public opinion has swung towards the reinstatement
of social services, although some evidence indicates that particularly
for the elderly, Social Security and Medicare are politically well
established.
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When national unemployment as well as unemployment in Oregon, peaks
at figures higher than have previously occurred since the Depression,
anxiety and political pressure for protection from uncontrollable
exigencies of the economic climate begin to grow.

Again, if this public

attitudinal change is not felt by policymakers at all levels of
government, it is less likely to be translated into meaningful change.
At the state and local government levels in Oregon, it is plain that
decisionmakers are very aware of the health care needs of state
residents, as evidenced by such efforts as Project Health, Multnomah
County's Multicare Project, the new State Health Insurance Plan proposal,
the Oregon Medical Association's recent plan, and the Blue Ribbon
Committee for Health Care for the Medically Indigent.
Combinations of strategies are indicated for increasing use of
different health services.

Various combinations of income, insurance and

source of medical care depend on decisionmakers' underlying values, the
relative strength of various lobbying interests, and the current mix of
service providers in the marketplace.
Combinations of insurance coverage linked with a regularized entry
point into the delivery system could provide the same health services use
outcomes as would a far larger increase in nontargeted monies focused on
income interventions.

An income intervention leaves choice of

consumption patterns up to the household.

Not every household ranks

health care as high on its list of priorities as policymakers might for
the overall welfare of society.

Some households underutilize health

care, while others overutilize it.

What must be

examin~d

is the extent
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to which appropriateness of use is linked with any strategy or
combinations of strategies.
Any successful policy intervention must include safeguards to
protect the access of populations which are not financially profitable to
serve.

First, governmental subsidization (local, state, federal, or a

combination) must be involved in the costs of providing care, and of
administrative and monitoring functions.

If left to the private sector,

providers likely will rationally seek to minimize the problems involved
with the higher health need, increased administrative problems, and
lesser rates of return associated with disadvantaged populations.

They

may attempt to select healthier individuals if mandated to serve such a
population, or seek to avoid serving them by locating in areas where high
risk, poverty populations are not an issue (e.g., the suburbs).
Second, universally mandated coverage of all the population within a
particular geographic area seems necessary.

It appears to be the only

way in which the higher costs associated with low income, less healthy or
perceived less desirable populations can be merged in with healthier,
lower cost populations served by mainstream health care delivery systems.
Third, strong regulatory controls over provider and consumer
behaviors are required.
utilization patterns.

This is necessary to ensure adequate control of
Rigorously designed and instituted information

monitoring systems are necessary to provide speedy and timely system
feedback.
Fourth,

~

well planned and organized health care system which

provides a comprehensive set of health services is crucial to the success
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of any proposal.

This system should emphasize preventive rather than

remedial services.
In conclusion, a need for a basic structural change in the health
care system is clearly indicated.

Nowhere is this more graphically

illustrated than by the continued barriers to access to health care faced
by households in the Health Policy Gap.

Although it is widely recognized

that national health insurance, income maintenance, and radical
restructuring of the health delivery system remain theoretically viable,
the practical reality is that given today's economic and political
climate, innovative approaches to providing he-:th care for the
disadvantaged are more likely to arise at the state and local levels.
With this in mind, the consumer choice model, with a provision for
an interim high risk public program to buffer private providers against
adverse selection by conswuers, offers the widest choice to clients, to
private providers, and to government.

It provides minimal governmental

administration compared with other universal plans and increases
competition and provider efficiency in the marketplace.

It also offers,

through increased monitoring and system feedback, incentives to all
involved to control costs and to utilize the system in a rational and
appropriate manner.
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lMartin Feldstein, ·Social Insurance," pp. 71-98 in Income
Redistribution, ed. by Colin D. Campbell, Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public policy Research, p. 77.
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